Externalities as Arbitrage∗

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Abstract

How can we assess whether macro-prudential regulations are having their intended effects? If these regulations are optimal, their marginal benefit of addressing externalities should equal their marginal cost of distorting risk-sharing. These risk-sharing distortions will manifest as trading opportunities that constrained intermediaries are unable to exploit. Focusing in particular on arbitrage opportunities, I construct an “externality-mimicking portfolio” whose returns track the externalities that would rationalize existing regulations as optimal. I conduct a revealed-preference exercise using this portfolio and test whether the recovered externalities are sensible. I find that the signs of existing CIP violations are inconsistent with optimal macro-prudential policy.

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Following the great financial crisis (GFC), apparent arbitrage opportunities have emerged in financial markets. These arbitrage opportunities, such as the gap between the federal funds rate and the interest on excess reserves (IOER) rate, or violations of covered interest rate parity (CIP), are notable in part because they have persisted for years after the peak of the financial crisis. Authors such as Du et al. (2018) have argued that macro-prudential regulations put in place after the GFC have enabled these arbitrages to exist and persist.

If these arbitrages are caused by macro-prudential regulations, does that imply that there is something wrong with the regulations? More generally, what can be learned from the patterns of arbitrage across assets induced by regulation? Can we use these patterns to assess whether macro-prudential regulations are having their intended effects?

In this paper I show that, under optimal policy, there is a close connection between the externalities policy is meant to address and the arbitrages policy creates. The core idea is simple: if a policy is optimal, its marginal costs equal its marginal benefits. The marginal costs of macro-prudential policies manifest themselves as arbitrage opportunities. Consequently, if policy is optimal, we can infer the marginal benefits (addressing externalities) from observed arbitrage opportunities. This enables a revealed-preference exercise. First, I calculate the externalities that would rationalize existing policy. Second, I ask whether these revealed externalities are reasonable. If they are not reasonable– I will argue many CIP violations have the wrong sign– then we can infer that policy is far from optimal.

There is a well-developed general theory on the use of macro-prudential policies to address externalities (Farhi and Werning (2016)). Macro-prudential policies, such as restrictions on leverage or capital controls, reallocate wealth between agents across states of nature and over time. For example, a capital control that limits borrowing from foreigners ensures that in bad times, domestic agents have higher consumption, and foreigners have less consumption, relative to what would have occurred in the absence of capital controls. If there is an externality that can be addressed by reallocating consumption from foreign to domestic agents in bad times (e.g. if the real exchange rate affects the welfare of domestic households that do not participate in financial markets, Fanelli and Straub (2019)), then capital controls might be an optimal policy. However, capital controls have a cost– they distort risk-sharing and inter-temporal trade between foreign and domestic agents. A social planner must weigh this cost against the benefits of capital controls.

Suppose that the planner implements the optimal capital controls using quantity restrictions, and thereby creates a wedge between the on-shore and the off-shore cost of borrowing. This would appear to a financial economist as an arbitrage opportunity that agents are
unable to exploit (due to the capital controls). If the planner’s optimal policy is to limit borrowing by domestic agents, the on-shore rate will be higher than the off-shore rate; if instead the optimal policy encourages borrowing, the reverse will be true. That is, the sign of the arbitrage is determined, under optimal policies, by the direction of the externality. Moreover, the magnitude of the arbitrage measures the size of the distortion created by the capital controls, and hence under an optimal policy is determined by the magnitude of the externalities being addressed. By observing the arbitrage, we can therefore infer the nature of the externalities that would justify the capital controls that create the arbitrage.

This example illustrates the basic idea behind the exercise. Reality, of course, is more complicated. Real-world macro-prudential policies such as leverage constraints on financial intermediaries have complicated effects, and it is not a priori obvious how they redistribute wealth between agents across states of nature and over time. Consequently, it is not clear whether or not these policies alleviate or exacerbate externalities. The framework I develop in this paper examines the arbitrages created by macro-prudential policies to assess whether or not these policies are having their intended effects.

I begin by outlining a general equilibrium with incomplete markets (GEI) framework that distinguishes between two classes of agents, “households” and “intermediaries.” In this framework, I show that optimal policy equates the marginal benefits of addressing externalities with the marginal cost of distorting risk-sharing (as in Farhi and Werning (2016)). I then show that, under some additional assumptions about how policy is implemented, these risk-sharing distortions will manifest themselves as arbitrage opportunities. To clarify the underlying mechanism and provide a concrete example, I develop the example of capital controls in a simple model, building on Fanelli and Straub (2019).

The central contribution of the paper uses the relationship between arbitrages and externalities to construct what I call the “externality-mimicking portfolio.” The returns of this portfolio are the projection of the externalities onto the space of returns. The portfolio can also be thought of as representing the minimum difference between the household and intermediary SDFs necessary to explain observed arbitrages (an analog of Hansen and Richard (1987)), or as the portfolio that maximizes what I call the “Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage” (an analog of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)).

Using data on interest rates, foreign exchange spot and forward rates, and foreign exchange options, I construct an externality-mimicking portfolio. The weights in this portfolio are entirely a function of asset prices; no estimation is required. If policy is optimal, this portfolio’s returns track the externalities the social planner perceives when consider-
ing transfers of wealth between the households and intermediaries in various states of the world. When its returns are positive (negative), the planner perceives positive (negative) externalities when transferring wealth from intermediaries to households. In “bad times,” we would expect this portfolio to have negative returns, consistent with the idea that the planner would like to encourage intermediaries to hold more wealth in these states.

I consider two definitions of “bad times.” First, intuitively, bad times can be defined as times in which the intermediaries have a high marginal utility of wealth. Using this definition, I show that it is sufficient to study the expected returns of the externality-mimicking portfolio, and test if they are positive. Second, I define “bad times” using the stress test scenarios developed by the Federal Reserve. I argue that these tests are statements about when the Fed would like intermediaries to have more wealth, and as a result the returns of the externality-mimicking portfolio should be negative in the stress test scenarios.

However, I find that the expected return of the externality-mimicking portfolio is generally negative, and that its returns in the stress tests are often positive. This implies that the externalities that would justify current regulation are positive in bad times, which appears inconsistent with intuition and suggests that regulations are not having their desired effect. The basic issue is that some CIP violations (e.g. AUD-USD and JPY-USD) have the wrong sign. That is, because JPY appreciates and AUD depreciates vs. USD in bad times, optimal policy should encourage intermediaries to be long JPY and short AUD (i.e. short the carry trade). But the signs of the CIP violations are such that they encourage intermediaries to be long the carry trade, taking on more macro-economic risk. I speculate that this issue arises from an interaction between leverage constraints (which do not consider the “sign” of a trade) and demand from customers for carry trade risk, as suggested by Du et al. (2018).

My theoretical framework builds on the GEI framework of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Farhi and Werning (2016). My example of capital controls resembles both Fanelli and Straub (2019) and example 5.4 of Farhi and Werning (2016). The framework I develop specializes the standard GEI model in several respects. First, I assume that there are two classes of agents, households and intermediaries, who have different degrees of access to markets, in the spirit of Gromb and Vayanos (2002). Second, a key difference between this paper and the work of Farhi and Werning (2016), and also the discussion of pecuniary externalities in Dávila and Korinek (2017), is my focus on an implementation of the constrained efficient allocation using quantity constraints, rather than agent-state- or agent-state-good-specific taxes. Studying this implementation is both realistic, in the sense that regulation on banks takes this form, and it enables the empirical exercise that follows.
This paper is also related to Davila et al. (2012), in that both papers attempt to measure how close existing policies are to constrained efficient allocations.

My empirical work considers short-term arbitrages such as the fed funds/IOER spread (Bech and Klee, 2011) and CIP violations (Du et al., 2018), and hence this paper lies at the intersection of the theoretical literature mentioned above and the empirical literature on arbitrage opportunities. The central and most surprising result of the paper is, in effect, that this intersection exists. The techniques I use to characterize the externality-mimicking portfolio that links the theory with the data build on Hansen and Richard (1987) and Hansen and Jagannathan (1991). There is also a significant literature that studies CIP violations in the context of particular models (as opposed to the general GEI framework). Examples include Amador et al. (2017); Andersen et al. (2019); Du et al. (2020); Gabaix and Maggiori (2015); Ivashina et al. (2015). The framework I develop allows for the empirical analysis of CIP violations within a relatively minimal theoretical structure, and hence enables more general conclusions about the optimality or sub-optimality of policy.

Section 1 outlines the GEI framework and presents the key result connection externalities and arbitrage. Section 2 provides a more concrete example of the general framework, related to capital controls. Section 3 describes the externality-mimicking portfolio. Section 4 describes the data I use in my empirical exercise, section 5 presents the main results, and I conclude in section 6. The internet appendix contains additional details on the empirical analysis, robustness exercises, and a formal discussion of the GEI framework.

1 Externalities and Arbitrage

In this section, I describe the connection between externalities and arbitrage under optimal policy in a GEI framework. First, I discuss the marginal-cost vs. marginal-benefit tradeoff facing the planner, building on the existing literature. Next, I introduce financial intermediation into the GEI framework, describe how the planner can implement optimal policies, and show that implementing the optimal policies creates apparent arbitrage opportunities.

1.1 The GEI Framework and Optimal Policy

Let $S_1$ be the set of future states, let $s_0$ be the initial state, and let $S = S_1 \cup \{s_0\}$. Let $J_s$ be the set of goods in each state $s \in S$. The simplest interpretation of this setup is as a two-date model with multiple goods in the second date. The model can also be interpreted as having
more than two dates and a single consumption good at each date, in which case each \( j \in J_s \) corresponds to consumption at some date.\(^1\) The key assumption is that there is at least one relative price (either between two goods or between two dates) in the future states \( s \in S_1 \).

Consider the problem of a planner who cannot transfer goods between agents ex-post (in states \( s \in S_1 \)), but can make transfers and control asset allocations in state \( s_0 \). The problem of the planner is to choose asset allocations for each agent, goods prices for each state, and initial transfers between agents, subject to market clearing, the constraint that transfers sum to zero, and the constraints on feasible asset allocations (e.g. market incompleteness). For a formal definition of the problem, see definition 3 in appendix section C.\(^2\)

Let \( \mu_{j,s} \) be the multiplier in the constrained planner’s problem on the market clearing constraint for good \( j \) in state \( s \), scaled to the units of prices, and let \( P^*_j, s \) be the price chosen by the planner for good \( j \) in state \( s \). The multiplier \( \mu_{j,s} \) can be interpreted as the additional social cost of good \( j \) in state \( s \) above the price \( P^*_j, s \) (the cost agents privately perceive).

If the prices that clear markets are also the prices that maximize social welfare (e.g. if the classic welfare theorems apply), the ratio of the social cost \( P^*_j, s + \mu_{j,s} \) to the private cost \( P^*_j, s \) will be the same for all goods \( j \in J_s \) within each state \( s \in S \).\(^3\) In this case, the agents’ and the planner’s preferences are perfectly aligned, and the solution to the constrained planner’s problem is also a competitive equilibrium.

However, if markets are incomplete, then generically, the solution to the constrained planner’s problem will not coincide with a competitive equilibrium (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986)). That is, due to the interactions of pecuniary externalities and market incompleteness, the economy is generically constrained inefficient. If prices are rigid, or if there are constraints on agents’ goods allocations that depend on prices, pecuniary externalities will lead to generic constrained inefficiency regardless of whether markets are complete or incomplete (Farhi and Werning (2016)). In these cases, the multipliers \( \mu_{j,s} \) are non-zero, and the ratio of \( P^*_j, s + \mu_{j,s} \) to \( P^*_j, s \) is not the same for all goods within each state.

In what follows, I will assume the economy is constrained inefficient. To simplify the exposition, I will focus on the incomplete markets case, but the results I derive will hold

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\(^1\)See Farhi and Werning (2016) for several examples along these lines.

\(^2\)The restriction against the planner transferring goods between agents in the future states \( S_1 \) prevents the planner from circumventing the incompleteness of markets. The ability of the planner to transfer income in state \( s_0 \) ensures that the purpose of regulation is to correct externalities, and not to redistribute wealth. This captures the idea that the goal of macro-prudential regulators is not to redistribute wealth ex-ante, but rather to influence the allocation of income across future states.

\(^3\)As usual, only relative prices matter. If \( j_0 \) is designated as the numeraire (implying \( \mu_{j_0,s} = 0 \) and \( P^*_{j_0,s} = 1 \)), then the ratio of social to private cost will be the same for all goods if and only if \( \mu_{j,s} = 0 \) for all goods.
regardless of whether the underlying source of inefficiency is incomplete markets, nominal rigidities, prices in constraints, or some combination thereof.

To quantify these inefficiencies, I define “wedges” (following Farhi and Werning (2016)). The wedge \( \tau_{r,j,s} \) is the difference between the social/private cost ratio for the good \( j \in J_s \) in state \( s \in S_1 \) and the average ratio for all goods in that state, \(^4\)

\[
\pi^r_{j,s} = -\frac{P^*_j + \mu_{j,s}}{P^*_j} + \frac{1}{|J_s|} \sum_{j' \in J_s} \frac{P^*_{j'} + \mu_{j',s}}{P^*_{j'}}.
\]

The wedge \( \tau_{j,s} \) is scaled by a full-support “reference” measure on \( S_1 \), \( \pi^r_{s} > 0 \). In the applications I consider, this measure is a risk-neutral measure or the physical probability measure. The wedges \( \tau_{r,j,s} \) are defined in the context of this reference measure, and if defined instead under an alternative reference measure \( \pi^r_{s} \) would be rescaled, \( \tau_{r,j,s} = \frac{\pi^r_{s}}{\pi^r_{s}} \tau_{r,j,s} \).

The wedge is positive if the social cost of a good is low relative to its price. The wedge is also the difference between the first-order conditions of the planner and of the agents—the latter do not account for effects of their demands on goods prices, and these pecuniary externalities, due to market incompleteness, have welfare consequences.

The wedges can be compensated for by transferring income in state \( s \) between agents. Let \( h \) and \( i \) be two agents in the economy. Let \( X^h_{i,j,s} \) be the change in \( h \)'s consumption of good \( j \) in state \( s \) if given a marginal unit of income, holding prices constant, evaluated at the income and prices that solve the constrained planner’s problem, and let \( X^i_{I,s} \) be the same income effect for \( i \).\(^5\) If the wedge-weighted difference of these income effects,

\[
\Delta^h_{i,r} = \sum_{j \in J_s} P^*_j \tau_{r,j,s} (X^h_{I,j,s} - X^i_{I,j,s}),
\]

is positive, transferring income from \( i \) to \( h \) in state \( s \) has a benefit, from the planner’s perspective, because it alleviates externalities. I will call \( \Delta^h_{i,r} \) the “externalities” because they summarize this benefit.\(^6\)

For goods \( j \in J_s \) with positive wedges \( \tau_{r,j,s} \), the social cost of the good is lower than the

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\(^4\)This definition of wedges is essentially the same as the one employed by Farhi and Werning (2016), adjusted for the difference between production and endowment economies and scaled by the reference measure \( \pi^r_{s} \). It is not necessary in what follows to define wedges for the state \( s_0 \).

\(^5\)That is, \( X^h_{i,j,s} \) is the demand function for good \( j \) of agent \( h \) in state \( s \), where \( I^h_s \) is the income of agent \( h \) in state \( s \), and \( X^h_{I,j,s} \) is its derivative with respect to income, evaluated at the income and prices that solve the constrained planner’s problem.

\(^6\)Farhi and Werning (2016) define an object \( \tau_{D,s} \), which is closely related, \( \pi^r_{s} \Delta^h_{i,r} = \tau^h_{D,s} - \tau^i_{D,s} \).
price, and it is desirable to increase demand for the good. If \( X_{i,j,s}^h > X_{I,j,s}^i \), then transferring income from \( i \) to \( h \) will indeed increase demand for the good. Summing these effects across goods determines the marginal benefit \( \Delta_{i,j,s}^{h,i,r} \) of a transfer of income from \( i \) to \( h \) in state \( s \).

Under optimal policy, the marginal benefit of reallocating income between \( i \) and \( h \) across the various states \( s \in S_1 \) must be offset by a marginal cost—distortions in risk-sharing. Absent regulation, agents will share risks by trading assets, ignoring the externalities just described. The planner, in contrast, distorts risk-sharing to address these externalities.

Let \( A \) be the set of assets in the economy, and let \( Z_{a,s}^* = Z_{a,s}(\{P_{j,s}^*\}_{j \in J_s}) \) denote the payoff of asset \( a \in A \) in state \( s \in S_1 \), given the goods prices \( \{P_{j,s}^*\}_{j \in J_s} \) that solve the planner’s problem. Consider an asset \( a \in A \) that can be freely traded by both \( i \) and \( h \) in the solution to the constrained planner’s problem (i.e. for which the exogenous portfolio constraints do not bind). The planner is free to reallocate the asset between these agents; as a result, the marginal benefit of such a reallocation must equal the marginal cost under optimal policies.

Reallocating the asset between \( h \) and \( i \) has a cost if it prevents those agents from equating their valuations of the asset. Let \( M_{s}^{h,r} \) be the stochastic discount factor (SDF) for \( h \) under the reference measure \( r \), given the incomes and prices that solve the constrained planner’s problem, and let \( M_{s}^{i} \) be the same for agent \( i \). The following proposition shows how the planner equates the marginal benefit of reducing externalities and the marginal cost of distorting risk-sharing.

**Proposition 1.** In the solution to the constrained planner’s problem, for any agents \( h \) and \( i \), and any asset \( a \in A \), if the exogenous portfolio constraints do not bind with respect to asset \( a \), then

\[
\sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_{s}^{r} \Delta_{s}^{h,i,r} Z_{a,s}^* = \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_{s}^{r} (M_{s}^{i,r} - M_{s}^{h,r}) Z_{a,s}^*.
\]

These results holds for both the endowment economy of appendix section C and the production economy of section 4 of Farhi and Werning (2016).

**Proof.** See the appendix, section E.1, or Farhi and Werning (2016). 

If there is a complete market of securities that can be freely reallocated by the planner between \( h \) and \( i \), then the externalities \( \Delta_{s}^{h,i,r} \) must exactly equal the difference of the agents’ SDFs, \( M_{s}^{i,r} - M_{s}^{h,r} \). In this case, the externalities can be non-zero if there are other agents who cannot trade in the complete securities market (as shown in the example of section 2

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\(^7\) \( M_{s}^{h,r} \) is the ratio of \( h \)’s marginal utility of income in state \( s \in S_1 \) relative to the marginal utility of income in state \( s \in S_0 \), adjusted for any differences between \( h \)’s subjective probabilities and the reference measure \( r \).
In the incomplete markets case, the externalities $\Delta_{h,i,r}$ are equal to the difference of the agents’ SDFs within the span of the payoff space of the assets that can be reallocated between the agents. That is, because the planner can move these assets between the agents, the planner must equate the marginal benefit of doing so (alleviating the externalities) with the marginal cost (distorting risk-sharing).

1.2 Arbitrage and the Implementation of Optimal Policy

The marginal cost vs. marginal benefit tradeoff just described arises from a planning problem in which the planner allocates assets for each of the agents. Because the planner chooses each agent’s asset allocation, asset prices do not enter the constrained planner’s problem. In this sub-section, I will describe how the planner can implement optimal policy using asset markets. In this implementation, there will be a single price for each asset, and hence I will be able to discuss asset prices. Let $Q_a$ be the price of asset $a \in A$ under the planner’s implementation of optimal policies.

There is tension between assuming that each asset has a single price and the results of Proposition 1. In the presence of externalities, Proposition 1 requires that the willingness to pay for asset $a$ of agent $h$ be different from that of agent $i$:

$$\sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_r^{r_s} M_s^{h,r} Z_{a,s}^h \neq \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_r^{r_s} M_s^{i,r} Z_{a,s}^i.$$

Consequently, the agents $h$ and $i$ cannot both be free to trade the asset at the price $Q_a$. To implement optimal policy, the planner must place constraints on one or both of the agents’ ability to trade the asset.\(^9\) These constraints are what I will call macro-prudential policy; leverage restrictions are an example.

The planner has a great deal of latitude about the form of these constraints. The agents, when trading the asset, will consider both the asset price and the shadow cost of the constraints (as in, e.g., Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) or Du et al. (2020)). As long as these prices and shadow costs are consistent with the requirements of Proposition 1, then the resulting equilibrium will be constrained efficient. That is, the functional form of the con-

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\(^8\)The externalities can also be non-zero if prices are rigid or if prices enter constraints on agents’ goods allocations, as discussed above.

\(^9\)The planner could also use agent-specific taxes on asset holdings, so that the post-tax asset price faced by the agents is different even if the pre-tax price is the same. The FDIC fees charged to US banks are an example along these lines. I focus on quantity constraints because these appear more common in practice.
straints does not matter, as long as the constraints generate the appropriate shadow costs. In particular, the constraints could be a function of both asset prices and portfolio choices (like a capital requirement), but this is not required.\footnote{For a formal definition of these portfolio constraints, see the appendix, Section §C.}

If these macro-prudential policies treat otherwise identical assets differently, they will create apparent arbitrage opportunities. Let us suppose that the assets $a$ and $a'$ have identical payoffs ($Z_{a,s}^* = Z_{a',s}^*$), but are treated differently in the planner’s implementation of optimal policy. Specifically, assume that agent $h$ is unconstrained and $i$ is constrained with respect to trade in $a$, and that the reverse is true for $a'$. In this case,

$$\sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r(M_s^{i,r} - M_s^{h,r})Z_{a,s}^* = Q_{a'} - Q_a = \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r \Delta_{s}^{h,i,r} Z_{a,s}^*,$$

meaning that the law of one price will not hold.

I will argue that assuming one agent prices the asset $a$ while another agent prices the asset $a'$ is both realistic and, after imposing additional structure on the GEI framework, without loss of generality. Let us now interpret the asset $a$ as an asset that is readily traded, and interpret the asset $a'$ as a replicating portfolio of assets traded only by experts (e.g. derivatives). Let us assume that the agent $h$ is a “household,” defined as an agent whose is able to trade the asset $a$ but cannot trade the asset $a'$. Let $i$ be an “intermediary,” defined as an agent who is able to trade all assets. If the planner implements optimal policy by regulating the trades of the intermediary in the asset $a$ (e.g. using leverage constraints), then the household’s SDF will price the asset $a$, the intermediary’s SDF will price the asset $a'$, and an apparent arbitrage opportunity will exist under optimal policy. That is, arbitrage arises due to the household’s inability to trade derivatives and the regulatory constraints facing intermediaries, as suggested by e.g. Du et al. (2018).

To formalize this interpretation and to show that it is without loss of generality for the planner to implement optimal policy by regulating intermediaries’ trades in non-derivative assets, I incorporate a some elements of financial intermediation (along the lines of, e.g., Gromb and Vayanos (2002)) into the GEI framework. Specifically, I will assume that all of the agents in the model are either households, drawn from the set $\mathcal{H}$, or intermediaries, drawn from the set $\mathcal{I}$. Intermediaries and households differ in two ways. First, intermediaries can trade certain assets (the set $A^I \subset A$) that households cannot, as discussed above. Second, households cannot trade directly with each other, only via intermediaries.\footnote{Formally, $A \setminus A^I$ is the union of a set of disjoint sets $\{A^h\}_{h \in \mathcal{H}}$, each containing assets tradable by the}
I will call an asset \( a \in A \setminus A^I \) “arbitrage-able” if there exists a portfolio of assets in \( A^I \) that replicate its payoff, regardless of the goods prices that occur in equilibrium. That is, for any arbitrage-able asset, there exists portfolio weights \( w_{a'}(a) \) such that, for all states \( s \in S_1 \) and all price levels \( \{P_{j,s}\} \),

\[
Z_{a,s}(\{P_{j,s}\}) = \sum_{a' \in A^I} w_{a'}(a) Z_{a',s}(\{P_{j,s}\}).
\]

Let \( A^* \) denote the set of arbitrage-able securities.

Given this financial intermediation structure, proposition 2 below shows it is without loss of generality for the planner to implement optimal policy via portfolio constraints on intermediaries only. Because households must trade through intermediaries, by regulating the trade of intermediaries with each household and with each other, the planner can dictate the asset allocation for all agents.\(^{12} \)

If the planner implements optimal policy without regulating the trades of households directly, then the household’s SDF will price the assets \( a \in A \setminus A^I \). That is, for any \( a \in A \setminus A^I \), there exists an \( h \in H \) such that

\[
Q_a = \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s M^h_s Z_{a,s}^*,
\]

In contrast, because the planner will need to regulate asset markets, the intermediaries’ SDF will not price the assets \( a \in A \setminus A^I \).

The situation is different for the intermediary-only assets. Proposition 2 shows that it is without loss of generality for the planner to have at least one intermediary that is unconstrained with respect to trade in the intermediary-only assets. Let us call this intermediary \( i^* \in I^* \). This intermediary prices the intermediary-only assets \( a' \in A^I \),

\[
Q_{a'} = \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s M^{i^*}_s Z_{a',s}^*.
\]

Now consider an arbitrage-able security \( a \), which is in \( A^h \) for some \( h \in H \). Applying (2) to this asset and (3) to its replicating portfolio illustrates the relationship between the household \( h \) and the intermediaries (but not other households). Note that multiple households can trade “the same” asset in the sense of payoffs; this formalism is simply a way of preventing households from trading directly with each other.

\(^{12}\)This point also illustrates the limits of the GEI framework I adopt. The model does not allow for either private information or hidden trade, both of which would limit the set of implementable allocations.
arbitrage on asset \( a \) and the externalities.

**Proposition 2.** The planner can implement the solution to the constrained planning problem using portfolio constraints on intermediaries only, and without constraining the trades of at least one intermediary, \( i^* \in \mathcal{I} \), in the intermediary-only assets \( A^I \).

In this implementation, for any arbitrage-able asset \( a \in A^* \) that is tradable by household \( h \), if the exogenous portfolio constraints do not bind for \( a \) or its replicating portfolio, then

\[
-Q_a + \sum_{a' \in A^I} w_{a'}(a) Q_{a'} = \underbrace{\sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^r_{s} \Delta_{s, i^*} Z_{s, a}}_{\text{expected externality-weighted payoffs}} - \underbrace{\sum_{a' \in A^I} w_{a'}(a) Q_{a'}}_{\text{arbitrage violation}}.
\]

(4)

**Proof.** See the appendix, section E.2.

This equation demonstrates the tight connection under optimal policy between arbitrage and the externalities the planner attempts to correct. To correct pecuniary externalities, the planner must distort risk-sharing. Under the assumed structure of financial intermediation, the planner can implement the optimal risk-sharing distortions by regulating intermediaries. In this implementation, certain assets will be priced by households (because households are not directly regulated) while others will be priced by intermediaries (because these assets are not tradable by households). For the subset of assets that are arbitrage-able (tradable by households with an intermediary-only replicating portfolio), this implementation of optimal policy will lead to an apparent arbitrage opportunity.

Strikingly, arbitrage is a generic feature of constrained efficient allocations (if the planner implements the constrained efficient allocation in the manner described by Proposition 2).\(^{13}\) The absence of arbitrage is not a sign of efficiency, but rather a sign of inefficiency in the presence of incomplete markets. More specifically, an arbitrage-able asset should be cheap relative to its replicating portfolio if its payoffs occur mainly in states in which the planner would like to transfer wealth from intermediaries to households.

The implementation described by Proposition 2, if interpreted literally, incorporates a strong assumption: that there exists an intermediary who is completely unconstrained with respect trade in the replicating portfolio. I view this assumption as an approximation to the observation that, in practice, intermediaries’ trades in derivatives are far less regulated than their trades in other products. I will discuss these practicalities in more detail when

\(^{13}\)Generically, externalities are non-zero and will lie in the span of the arbitrage-able asset’s payoff space.
describing my empirical exercise. First, however, I provide a concrete example to further illustrate the connection between externalities and arbitrage.

2 An Example of Externalities as Arbitrage

This section describes a modified version of Fanelli and Straub (2019) (see also example 5.4 of Farhi and Werning (2016)) to further illustrate the meaning of Proposition 2. In this example, a planner limits foreign-currency lending by intermediaries (i.e. uses capital controls) to stabilize the real exchange rate. This creates a CIP violation, and the size and direction of this CIP violation is determined by the externalities as in (4).

This example connects to the empirical exercise that follows in that it illustrates how CIP violations can arise from optimal macro-prudential policy. However, this example focuses on capital controls, and hence is more naturally interpreted as concerning developing economies, whereas my empirical application focuses on developed markets and bank regulation. I present this example, rather than a model of bank regulation, because I believe this example more transparently illustrates the principles behind the exercise.

There are two types of domestic households, Ricardians and non-participants ($\mathcal{H} = \{r, n\}$). In each state, there are two goods, tradable and non-tradable, $J_s = \{T, NT\}$. Both households have log utility preferences over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of tradables and non-tradables, with share parameter $\alpha$ on tradables.

The future state can be either good ($g$) or bad ($b$), $S_1 = \{g, b\}$. Non-participants are endowed with non-tradables $Y_{NT}^n$ and tradables $Y_{T,s}^n$, with $Y_{T,g}^n > Y_{T,b}^n$. Ricardian households are endowed only with tradables $Y_T^n$. Only $Y_{T,s}^n$ varies across the states; otherwise, the states are identical. Foreign intermediaries are risk-neutral, consume tradables only, and have a large endowment of tradables in all states. The discount factor for both households is $\beta < 1$, and the discount factor for intermediaries is one.

The tradables price is stable in the foreign currency, and the domestic monetary authority stabilizes the domestic price index. The exchange rate is therefore $e_s = (\frac{P_{NT}}{P_{T,s}})^{1-\alpha}$, and I will use the tradable good as the numeraire ($P_{T,s} = 1$). Ricardians can trade both a foreign-currency risk-free bond $a_{fc}$, with $Z_{afc,s}(P_{NT,s}) = 1$, and a domestic risk-free bond $a_{dc}$, with $Z_{adc,s}(P_{NT,s}) = (P_{NT,s})^{1-\alpha}$. Intermediaries can trade both of these bonds, an intermediary-only foreign currency risk-free bond $a_I$, and a currency forward $a_F$ at exchange rate $F$, $Z_{aF,s}(P_{NT,s}) = (P_{NT,s})^{1-\alpha} - F$. The bonds $a_{fc}$ and $a_{dc}$ are both arbitrage-able: $Z_{afc,s}(\cdot) = Z_{aF,s}(\cdot)$ and $F \times Z_{aI,s}(\cdot) + Z_{aF,s}(\cdot) = Z_{adc,s}(\cdot)$. Non-participants cannot trade
any assets.

The planner’s problem is to maximize a weighted sum of household utility, subject to a participation constraint for the foreign intermediaries. Because there is a complete market traded between intermediaries and Ricardians, the participation constraint of the intermediaries creates a unified budget constraint for the Ricardians.

Let \( \pi^p \) be the physical measure,\(^{14} \) with \( \pi^p_{s_0} = 1 \), let \( T_{s_0} \) be the transfer in \( s_0 \) to non-participants, and let \( \lambda^p \) and \( \lambda^r \) be strictly positive Pareto weights. The planner solves

\[
\max_{\{I^p_s \geq 0, I^p_r \geq 0\}_{s \in S}, \{P_{NT,s} \geq 0\}_{s \in S}, T_{s_0 \in \{r, n\}}} \sum_{s \in S} \lambda^p_s \sum_{h \in \{r, p\}} \pi^p_s V^h_s (I^h_s, P_{NT,s}),
\]

subject to non-tradable market clearing, \( Y_{NT} = \sum_{h \in \{r, p\}} X^h_{NT,s} (I^h_s, P_{NT,s}), \forall s \in S \),

the non-participants budget constraints, \( I^p_s = P_{NT,s} Y_{NT} + Y^n_{NT,s} + 1 \{s = s_0\} T_{s_0}, \forall s \in S \),

and the Ricardian budget constraint, \( I^r_{s_0} + \pi^p g \lambda^p + \pi^p b \lambda^p \leq 2 Y^n - T_{s_0} \).

The functional forms in this example yield simple expressions for the indirect utility and demand functions. The demand function is \( X^h_{NT,s} (I^h_s, P_{NT,s}) = (1 - \alpha) \frac{I^h_s}{P_{NT,s}} \), and

\[
V^h_s (I^h_s, P_{NT,s}) = \begin{cases} 
\beta [\ln(I^h_s) - \ln(P^1_{NT,s}) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(1 - \alpha)] & s \in \{g, b\}, \\
\ln(I^h_s) - \ln(P^1_{NT,s}) + (1 - \alpha) \ln(1 - \alpha) & s = s_0.
\end{cases}
\]

The market-clearing condition highlights the pecuniary externality present in the model. If the Ricardian households sell a bond, reallocating income from the states in \( S_1 \) to the state \( s_0 \), this will increase the price of the non-tradable good in \( s_0 \) and reducing the price in the states \( \{g, b\} \). These price changes have an effect on welfare because the poor households face incomplete (in this case, non-existent) markets. Specifically, the additional social cost of the non-tradable good, \( \mu_{NT,s} \), is determined by the planner’s first-order condition with respect to \( P_{NT,s} \), and can be written for \( s \in S_1 \) as

\[
\frac{\mu_{NT,s}}{P_{NT,s}} = \beta \frac{I^p_{s_0}}{\lambda^p n} \pi^p_s \frac{\lambda^n + \lambda^r}{I^n_s + I^r_s} - \frac{\lambda^n}{I^n_s},
\]

where \( \frac{\lambda^n}{I^n_s} \mu_{NT,s} \) is the multiplier on the goods market clearing constraint. In states in which the income share of non-participants, \( \frac{I^p_s}{I^p_s + I^r} \), is lower than the relative welfare weight \( \frac{\lambda^n}{\lambda^n + \lambda^r} \),

\(^{14}\)Because intermediaries are risk-neutral, this is also the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure.
the planner would like to increase non-participant incomes. Because non-participants are net sellers of non-tradables, it is desirable in this case to increase $P_{NT,s}$ and the social cost of non-tradables is less than the private cost ($\mu_{NT,s} < 0$). Note that I have ignored tradable goods market clearing (Walras’ law), and without loss of generality $\mu_{T,s} = 0$.

The wedges are $\pi_s^p \tau_{NT,s} = -\pi_s^p \tau_T = -\frac{1}{2} \mu_{NT,s} \pi_s^p$, and the externalities simplify to

$$\Delta_s^{i,p} = -(1 - \alpha) \frac{\mu_{NT,s}}{P_{NT,s} \pi_s^p} = (1 - \alpha) \beta \frac{P_{s0}^n}{\pi_s^p (1 - \lambda^n + \lambda^r) \frac{P_{s0}^n}{\pi_s^p} + \frac{P_{s0}^n}{\lambda^n} \frac{P_{s0}^n}{\lambda^r} \frac{P_{s0}^n}{\lambda^r}}.$$

Let us now consider the first-order conditions of the planner’s problem with respect to Ricardian households’ income and with respect to the transfer $T_{s0}$. We have, for $s \in \{g, b\}$,

$$\beta \frac{\lambda^r}{I_s^r} (1 - \alpha) \frac{\mu_{NT,s}}{P_{NT,s} I_s^r} = \pi_s^p \frac{\lambda^n}{I_s^r} - \pi_s^p (1 - \alpha) \frac{\mu_{NT,s0}}{P_{NT,s0} I_s^r} = \pi_s^p \frac{\lambda^n}{I_s^r} - \pi_s^p (1 - \alpha) \frac{\mu_{NT,s0}}{P_{NT,s0} I_s^r}.$$

The transfer ensures that the goods market at date zero is efficient (a little algebra shows that $\mu_{NT,s0} = 0$). Combining these equations produces the complete markets analog of (1),

$$\pi_s^p (M_s^{i,p} - M_s^{r,p}) = \pi_s^p \Delta_s^{i,p}, \quad (5)$$

where $M_s^{i,p} = 1$ and $M_s^{r,p} = \beta \frac{\mu_{s0}}{I_s^r}$ are the SDFs of the intermediaries and Ricardians, respectively. Summing this equation weighted by the payoffs $Z_{a,s}(P_{NT,s}^a)$ gives a version of (1) for log-utility households and risk-neutral intermediaries.

We can see from these equations that the externalities must be non-zero in the solution to the planner’s problem (and hence that competitive equilibria are inefficient). If the externalities were zero, the income shares $I_g^a \frac{P_{g0}^n}{P_{g0}^n} + I_b^a$ and $I_b^a \frac{P_{b0}^n}{P_{b0}^n}$ would both equal $\frac{\lambda^n}{\lambda^n + \lambda^r}$, by (5) the Ricardian incomes would be equal, $I_g^a = I_b^a$, and therefore the non-participant incomes would be equal, $I_g^a = I_b^a$. Market clearing in non-tradables requires that if incomes are identical across $\{g, b\}$, so are prices. But if the non-tradable price is the same in $g$ and $b$, non-participant income cannot be equal in those states by the assumption that $Y^n_{T,g} > Y^n_{T,b}$, and therefore the externalities must be non-zero.

More specifically, in the solution to the planner’s problem, the non-tradable price will be lower in $b$ than in $g$. Consequently, the domestic bond has a lower return in $b$ than in $g$. In the absence of regulation, in the competitive equilibrium of this example the Ricardians will borrow from intermediaries using the foreign currency bond (because $\beta < 1$ and the Ricardians have no income risk). The planner, to increase the price of non-tradables in
state \( b \) relative to state \( g \), would instead prefer that Ricardians borrow from intermediaries using the domestic bond, thereby increasing Ricardian income in \( b \) relative to \( g \). A macro-prudential regulation limiting the quantity of foreign-currency lending by intermediaries is one way of implementing this outcome. Depending on parameters, the planner might also limit the total amount of lending by intermediaries.

When the planner implements optimal policies as described in proposition 2, the externalities \( \Delta_{r,i,p} \) will manifest as arbitrages. The Ricardians will price the foreign-currency and domestic-currency bonds \( a_{fc} \) and \( a_{dc} \). The foreign intermediaries will price the intermediary-only (i.e. offshore) foreign-currency risk-free bond \( a_I \) and the currency forward \( a_F \). The resulting arbitrages are

\[
Q_{af} - Q_{afc} = \pi^p_{f} \Delta_{r,f} + \pi^p_{b} \Delta_{r,i} , \tag{6}
\]

\[
F \times Q_{af} + Q_{af} - Q_{ad} = \pi^p_{f} \Delta_{r,f} (P^*_{NT,g})^{1-\alpha} + \pi^p_{b} \Delta_{r,i} (P^*_{NT,b})^{1-\alpha} . \tag{7}
\]

The first of these arbitrages is a difference between the price intermediaries use when borrowing or lending with each other and the price they use when borrowing or lending to the Ricardian households. The second is a CIP violation that involves the domestic currency bonds (the asset Ricardians can trade) and a replicating portfolio only intermediaries can trade (the currency forward and the intermediary-only bond). These two arbitrages closely resemble the arbitrages I study in the empirical exercise that follows.

### 3 The Externality-Mimicking Portfolio

Let us now adopt the perspective of a financial economist who observes asset prices, and wants to know what externalities would justify the patterns of arbitrage in those asset prices. Suppose the financial economist observes prices for a set of arbitrage-able assets \( A^* \) tradable by some household \( h \), along with the prices of the corresponding replicating portfolios of intermediary-only assets (e.g. derivatives). Further suppose that the financial economist believes these arbitrages are caused by regulation, and not by other frictions that are exogenous from the perspective of regulators.\(^{15}\) In the context of the preceding example, \( A^* = \{a_{fc}, a_{dc}\} \) (the foreign and domestic currency bonds), and \( h \) is a Ricardian household.

Suppose regulatory policy is optimal. In the example of the previous section, equations

\(^{15}\)Plausible real-world examples include the post-GFC CIP violations documented by Du et al. (2018) and the difference between the federal funds rate and the IOER rate documented by Bech and Klee (2011).
(6) and (7) will hold, and more generally proposition 2 will apply. In this section, I show how these equations can be “inverted” to recover externalities from asset prices. When the assets in $A^*$ form a complete market (i.e. in the example of the previous section), we can perfectly recover the externalities from asset prices. When $A^*$ does not form a complete market, we will instead recover the projection of the externalities on to the space of returns. In both cases, we will recover the (projected) externalities by constructing a portfolio, the “externality-mimicking portfolio,” whose returns track the externalities.

For simplicity, I use the space of returns, $R_{a,s} = \frac{Z_{a,s}}{Q_a}$, as opposed to the space of payoffs, and therefore assume that every arbitrage-able asset and its replicating portfolio have strictly positive prices.\(^{16}\) The return of an arbitrage-able asset $a \in A^*$, $R_{a,s}$, and the return of its replicating portfolio, $R_{Ia,s}$, are linked by the relationship

$$R_{Ia,s} = (1 - \chi_a) R_{a,s},$$

is a scale-free measure of arbitrage. Intuitively, when the asset is cheaper than its replicating portfolio, its returns are higher. Using this notation, we can rewrite (6) and (7) from the example in the previous section as

$$\begin{bmatrix} \chi_{afc} \\ \chi_{ad} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \pi_g^p R_{afc,g}^l \\ \pi_g^p R_{ad,g}^l \end{bmatrix} \cdot \Delta_{g,i,p}^{r,i,p} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \chi_{afc} \\ \chi_{ad} \end{bmatrix}. $$

Now consider the portfolio of replicating portfolios (in this example, a portfolio of the currency forward and intermediary-only bond, expressed as portfolio weights on the replicating portfolios of the bonds traded by Ricardian households) defined by

$$\begin{bmatrix} \theta_{afc}^* \\ \theta_{ad}^* \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R_{afc,g}^l & R_{ad,g}^l \\ R_{afc,b}^l & R_{ad,b}^l \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \pi_g^p R_{afc,g}^l \\ \pi_g^p R_{ad,g}^l \end{bmatrix}^{-1} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \chi_{afc} \\ \chi_{ad} \end{bmatrix}. $$

By construction, this portfolio has returns that are equal to the externalities in each state,

$$\begin{bmatrix} \Delta_{g,i,p}^{r,i,p} \\ \Delta_{b,i,p}^{r,i,p} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} R_{afc,g}^l & R_{ad,g}^l \\ R_{afc,b}^l & R_{ad,b}^l \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \theta_{afc}^* \\ \theta_{ad}^* \end{bmatrix}. $$

\(^{16}\)This is without loss of generality if there is a risk-free arbitrage-able security, as one could always add some amount of the risk-free security to another other security to ensure that its price is positive, while still ensuring that a replicating portfolio exists.
This portfolio, which is externality-mimicking portfolio in the context of the capital controls example, is the projection of the externalities onto space of returns. In this example, which features complete markets, the portfolio’s returns are the unique set of externalities that would justify the observed pattern of arbitrage. More generally, in the incomplete markets case, the externality-mimicking portfolio’s returns are a (not unique) set of externalities that would justify the observed pattern of arbitrage.

These results are analogous to (and build on) the results of Hansen and Richard (1987), who study the projection of an SDF onto the space of returns. Those authors also show that their projection is equivalent to minimizing the variance of an SDF, subject to the constraint that the SDF price a set of assets. Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) then show that the portfolio whose returns are the projection of the SDF is also the portfolio with the maximum available Sharpe ratio. Below, I develop analogous interpretations of the externality-mimicking portfolio.

Constructing the externality-mimicking portfolio requires three ingredients:
1. A set of arbitrage-able assets $A^*$,
2. Prices for both the arbitrage-able assets in $A^*$ and their replicating portfolios, and
3. Expected returns and a variance-covariance matrix for the assets in $A^*$.

I assume, to simplify the exposition, that $A^*$ includes a risk-free asset, whose return is $R_f$. Let $R_f^I = (1 - \chi_f)R_f$ be the return on the replicating portfolio of the risk-free asset, and let $\chi^{A^*}$ be the vector of scaled arbitrages $\chi_a$ for the risky assets in $A^*$. Let $\mu^{A^*, r}$ and $\Sigma^{A^*, r}$ be the mean vector and variance-covariance matrix of the returns $R_{a,s}$ for each risky arbitrage-able asset $a \in A^*$, under some measure $\pi_f$. Given $\mu^{A^*, r}$ and $\Sigma^{A^*, r}$, the mean returns and variance-covariance matrix for the returns $R_{a,s}^I$, $\mu^{A^*, I, r}$ and $\Sigma^{A^*, I, r}$, are defined by the relationship $R_{a,s}^I = (1 - \chi_a)R_{a,s}$. I assume there are no redundant risky arbitrage-able assets ($\Sigma^{A^*, r}$ has full rank). From these objects, I define the externality-mimicking portfolio.

Note, by definition, that the space of returns of the arbitrage-able assets is identical to the space of returns of the replicating portfolios. As a result, the externality-mimicking portfolio can be defined as either a portfolio of the arbitrage-able assets or as a portfolio of replicating portfolios. It is convenient for what follows to define it as a portfolio of replicating portfolios; for the alternative definition, see appendix section D.

**Definition 1.** The externality-mimicking portfolio is a portfolio of the replicating portfolios
of $A^*$, with weights on the risky replicating portfolios equal to
\[ \theta^{A^*,r} = (\Sigma^{A^*,r})^{-1} (\chi^{A^*} - \chi_f \frac{\mu^{A^*,r}}{R_f}) \]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

and a weight on the risk-free replicating portfolio equal to
\[ \theta^{A^*,r}_f = - (\theta^{A^*,r})^T \frac{\mu^{A^*,r}}{R_f} + \frac{1}{(R_f)^2} \chi_f. \]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Proposition 3 below demonstrates four facts about this portfolio. The first two facts show that this portfolio is the projection of the externalities (under the assumptions of proposition 2) onto the space of replicating portfolio returns (i.e. the space of returns for assets in $A^*$). The third fact shows that the return of the portfolio is the difference between the household and intermediary SDFs, projected onto the space of returns. The fourth fact shows that the portfolio maximizes the “Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage,” which I define next.

Given an arbitrary portfolio $\theta$ of risky assets in $A^*$, consider both its Sharpe ratio, $S^{A^*,r} (\theta)$, and the Sharpe ratio of the replicating portfolio,\(^{18}\)
\[ S^{A^*,r} (\theta) = \frac{\theta^T \mu^{A^*,r}}{R_f} - \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a \]  \[ \frac{1}{(\theta^T \Sigma^{A^*,r} \theta)^{\frac{1}{2}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (11)

$S^{A^*,r} (\theta)$ is defined similarly, with $(\mu^{A^*,r}, \Sigma^{A^*,r}, R_f)$ in the place of $(\mu^{A^*,r}, \Sigma^{A^*,r}, R_f)$.

Because the prices of the replicating portfolios are not the same as the prices of the arbitrage-able assets, an allocation in dollars to arbitrage-able assets and the same dollar asset allocation to the replicating portfolios are in fact claims to different cashflows.\(^{19}\) I would like instead to compare portfolios that are claims to the same cashflows, but perhaps have different prices. To that end, define the portfolio transformation $\tilde{\theta}(\theta)$ by
\[ \tilde{\theta}_a(\theta) = (1 - \chi_a) \theta_a. \]

\(^{18}\)The definition of the Sharpe ratio given here is signed, and might be scaled by the inverse of $R_f$ when compared to other definitions of the Sharpe ratio. Note also that the portfolio weights $\theta$ do not need sum to one (the units of $\theta$ are “dollars”, not percentages), and that the Sharpe ratio is homogenous of degree zero.

\(^{19}\)For example, if both intermediaries and households can buy stocks at $1/share but households pay $2/bond whereas intermediaries pay $1/bond, an allocation of $4 split equally between stocks and bonds means two shares and two bonds for the intermediaries, but two shares and one bond for the households.
This transformation converts an allocation in dollars at the replicating portfolio prices to an allocation in dollars at the arbitrage-able asset prices.

I define the “Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage” as the difference between the Sharpe ratio on a set of claims and the replicating Sharpe ratio of those same claims,

\[ \hat{S}_{A^*, r}(\theta) = S_{A^*, r}(\theta) - S_{A^*, r}(\theta) \]

A little algebra shows that the Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage is the ratio of the excess arbitrage, \( \chi_A^* - \chi_f^* \frac{\mu_{A^*, r}}{R_f^*} \), to the volatility of the portfolio,

\[ \hat{S}_{A^*, r}(\theta) = \frac{\theta^T \cdot (\chi_A^* - \chi_f^* \frac{\mu_{A^*, r}}{R_f^*})}{(\theta^T \Sigma_{A^*, r} \theta)^{\frac{1}{2}}} \]

Using this definition, I summarize the properties of the externality-mimicking portfolio.

**Proposition 3.** Under the assumptions of proposition 2, the externality-mimicking portfolio has the following properties:

1. The externalities are the return on the portfolio plus a zero-mean residual, uncorrelated with the returns of all arbitrage-able assets \( a \in A^* \): for all \( i \in I \),

\[ \Delta_{h^*, r} = \sum_{a \in A^*} R_{a, s}^l \theta_{a, r}^* + \epsilon_{s}^A, \]

\[ \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r R_{a, s}^l \epsilon_{s}^A = 0 \forall a \in A^*. \]

2. The variance of the externalities, \( \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r (\Delta_{h^*, r} - \frac{Z_f^*}{R_f^*})^2 \), is weakly greater than the variance of the externality-mimicking portfolio’s return, \( (\theta_{A^*, r})^T \Sigma_{A^*, r} \theta_A^* \).

3. Let \( m_{s}^l, r \) be any SDF that prices the replicating portfolios under the measure \( \pi_s^r \). Then \( m_s^r = m_s^l \sum_{a \in A^*} R_{a, s}^l \theta_{a, r}^* \) is the solution to the problem:

\[ \min_{m_s^l \in \mathbb{R}^{S_1}} \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r (m_s^r - m_{s}^l)^2 \text{ subject to } \]

\[ \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi_s^r m_s R_{a, s} = 1 \forall a \in A^*. \]

4. The Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage of the externality-mimicking portfolio, \( \hat{S}_{A^*, r}(\theta_{A^*, r}) \), is weakly greater than the Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage of any other portfolio of
replicating portfolios of the assets in \( A^* \).

**Proof.** See the appendix, section E.3. \( \square \)

The first two claims follow from the least-squares projection. The third is the analog of Hansen and Richard (1987), and shows that the estimated household SDF \( m^s_s = m^I_s r^s + \sum_{a \in A^*} R_{u,a,s} \theta^A_{a,r} \) is the one that makes the household’s and intermediary’s SDFs as close as possible, subject to the constraint that it price the arbitrage-able assets \( A^* \) (and therefore differ sufficiently from \( m^I_s r^s \), which prices the replicating portfolios).\(^{20}\) The fourth claim is the analog of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), and shows that the externality-mimicking portfolio is also the one the maximizes the Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage.

The externality-mimicking portfolio is a reflection of what regulation is actually accomplishing. Consider a state \( s \) in which the externality-mimicking portfolio has a negative 10\% return. If policy is optimal, the best linear prediction of the externalities in this state is negative 10\%. That is, the planner would be indifferent between being able to transfer ex-post one extra dollar from households to intermediaries in state \( s \) and receiving an additional 10\% \( \times \pi^s \) dollars in the initial state \( s_0 \).

The externality-mimicking portfolio is defined in the context of the reference measure \( \pi^r \). In my empirical exercises, I focus on the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, \( \pi^*_s = \pi^p_s R^M_{s,r} \), and consider the physical (or actual) probability measure, \( \pi^p \), in robustness exercises. The two corresponding externalities are the “risk-neutral externalities” \( \Delta^h,i^r,i^r \) and the “physical externalities” \( \Delta^h,i^r,i^p \), which are linked by the relationship

\[
\pi^p_s \Delta^h,i^r,i^p = \pi^s_i \Delta^h,i^r,i^r.
\]

This connection reflects the usual equivalence in asset pricing between state-dependent preferences and beliefs. Using the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio has a particular advantage, which is that all expected returns are equal to the risk-free rate, and hence observable. Moreover, options and quanto option\(^{21}\) prices (which I presume are traded only by intermediaries) can reveal risk-neutral variances and covariances (Martin (2017); Kremens and Martin (2019)). If we consider only arbitrage-able assets for which options and quantos are available (currencies and the S&P 500), no estimation is required when constructing the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio. Using the physical measure, in

\(^{20}\)That is, \( m^r \) maximizes a “market integration” measure along the lines of Chen and Knez (1995).

\(^{21}\)A quanto option is an option that involves both an exchange rate and an asset (such as the S&P 500). See appendix section A.4 or Kremens and Martin (2019) for details.
contrast, requires estimating both expected returns and a variance-covariance matrix.

The externality-mimicking portfolio reveals what externalities would justify observed patterns of arbitrage under an optimal policy. The next step in our revealed preference exercise is to ask whether the recovered externalities make sense. We generally expect that externalities (and hence the mimicking portfolio returns) are negative in “bad” states of the world. That is, governments seem tempted to bailout intermediaries in bad states, not in good states. To test whether regulations are consistent with this intuition, we need to define what we mean by “bad” states. I consider two definitions, which result in two different tests. The first definition is to define bad times as being bad for the intermediaries, which is to say that the intermediaries’ SDF is high. The second definition involves studying a particular situation– the “stress tests” conducted by the Federal Reserve– in which the regulator is concerned about externalities, and would like intermediaries to have more wealth. Presumably, the idea behind the stress tests is to ensure that intermediaries have sufficient wealth in the stress scenario so as to avoid a bailout ex-post.

The first approach yields a simple test. The covariance of the intermediary SDF and the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio, under the physical measure, is

\[
\text{Cov}^p(M^i^*, r_s, \Delta^h, t^*, r_s) = \frac{1}{R_f}(Z_f - \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^s \Delta^h, t^*, r_s)
\]

\[
= -\frac{1}{R_f}(\theta^A, t^* - \mu^A, t^* - R_f) + \text{Cov}^p(M^i^*, r_s, \epsilon^A, t^*)
\]

If the externalities are negatively correlated with the intermediaries’ SDF, the expected excess return of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio under the physical measure should be positive. Therefore, after constructing the externality-mimicking portfolio, I will estimate its expected returns and ask whether or not they are positive. The covariance term between the projection error and the intermediary SDF shows that this test would be biased if there are components of the SDF that are not spanned by the space of returns, and which are correlated with components of the externalities that are also unspanned.

The second approach uses stress tests to identify a particular state (the stress test scenario) in which externalities should be negative. The purpose of the stress test is to verify that intermediaries have sufficient wealth in the stress scenario. To the extent that regulations achieve this goal, they must operate by inducing the intermediaries to hold different assets and issue different liabilities than they otherwise would have. Consequently, the intermediaries’ counterparts (the households) must also hold different assets and issue
different liabilities than they otherwise would have. In other words, if the regulations act to raise intermediaries’ wealth in certain scenarios, they must lower the wealth of households in those scenarios (at least in an endowment economy). That is, stress test scenarios are a statement when the regulator perceives negative externalities associated with transferring wealth from intermediaries to households (negative $\Delta^{h,i,r}$). Consequently, if the regulations are having the desired effect, returns on the externality-mimicking portfolio in the stress test scenario should be negative. This test is biased if the unspanned component of the externalities is large in absolute value in the stress scenario.

In this revealed preference exercise, I am recovering the externalities by observing the effects of regulators’ policy choices and assuming those choices are optimal. This is not because I truly believe regulators’ policy choices are optimal, in a strict mathematical sense, but rather because I wish to know if the externalities that would rationalize existing policy are reasonable, and by extension if existing policies are reasonable. For this reason, the tests I have constructed are “weak” in that they consider only whether the signs of the externality-mimicking portfolio returns are sensible.

4 Data

In this section, I describe the arbitrages, data sources, and additional assumptions I use to conduct the tests described in the previous section.

The set of arbitrage-able securities $A^*$ should be limited to arbitrages induced by regulation. I therefore focus on short maturity arbitrages, to avoid issues like the classic limits to arbitrage argument (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) and debt overhang (Andersen et al. (2019)). This precludes many of the arbitrages documented in the literature. I focus on arbitrages appeared after but not before the global financial crisis, reasoning that these arbitrages are likely to be induced by post-crisis regulatory changes. Two classes of arbitrage that fit these criteria are the difference between the federal funds rate and the IOER rate and CIP violations (Bech and Klee (2011); Du et al. (2018)).

Constructing the externality-mimicking portfolio requires determining what is the “asset” $a \in A^*$ and what is the “replicating portfolio.” My framework offers two ways of making this distinction: assets $a \in A^*$ are tradable by households, whereas replicating portfolios are not, and intermediaries’ trades in assets $a \in A^*$ are regulated, whereas trades in the replicating portfolio are not. To a first approximation, the difference between “cash assets” and “derivatives” lines up with both of these distinctions: derivatives are both less accessible to
Consider first the fed funds/IOER arbitrage, which is the difference of two risk-free rates. A bank can earn interest on excess reserves held at the Fed, whereas a household cannot. If there is no meeting of the FOMC within the next month, the bank is essentially guaranteed to earn one month’s worth of interest at the current overnight rate.\footnote{In rare circumstances, the Fed might change the IOER rate between meetings, but such changes have low ex-ante likelihood and are unlikely to materially alter the expected interest rate.} A household could instead purchase treasury bills, highly-rated commercial paper, repo agreements (via money market funds), bank deposits, or the like. There is a significant literature arguing that treasury bonds are special, relative to other bonds that appear to be close substitutes (e.g. Fleckenstein et al. (2014)). For this reason, I use 1-month OIS swap rates, which closely track the yields of one-month maturity highly-rated commercial paper in the US, as a proxy for a risk-free rate available to households that provides no liquidity benefits. These rates tend to be higher than the rates on one-month constant maturity treasuries, but lower than LIBOR rates (which may include credit risk).\footnote{For example, on August 19th, 2016 (a little over one month before the next FOMC meeting), the one-month constant-maturity treasury rate was 27bps, the AA non-financial one-month commercial paper rates was 37bps, the one-month OIS rate was 40bps, the IOER rate was 50bps, and one-month LIBOR was 52bps.} In the notation of the model, $R_f$ is the one-month OIS swap rate, and $R^I_f$ is the interest rate on excess reserves.

Next, consider CIP violations. Here, guided by the “cash vs. derivatives” heuristic, I assume that households can purchase foreign-currency bonds, but cannot trade derivatives easily.\footnote{That is, either the household literally cannot trade derivatives, or the transactions costs on derivatives trades for households are high enough that households cannot profitably execute the arbitrage.} The asset $a \in A^*$ is therefore a claim to one euro in one month, and households can purchase this asset by spot exchanging dollars for euros and then purchasing a risk-free euro-denominated bond. Following Du et al. (2020), I use OIS rates as proxies for the risk-free rates available to households in various currencies. The replicating portfolio involves an intermediary earning the dollar IOER rate for one month and using a one-month FX forward to lock in the dollar/euro exchange rate.\footnote{Implicitly, I am assuming that the default risk on the forward contract is negligible (or, to be more precise, that the pricing data reflects forward rates available to a risk-free counterparty). Du et al. (2018) argue, persuasively in my view, that this risk is negligible.}

The third arbitrage I study, in robustness exercises in appendix section B.3, is an arbitrage between the SPDR S&P 500 ETF and options on that ETF, which trade on the CBOE under the ticker SPY. This arbitrage is closely related to the classic index-future arbitrage involving S&P 500 futures (e.g. Chung (1991); MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988); Miller et al. (1994)). I describe this arbitrage in more detail in appendix section A.3.
My data sample begins on January 4, 2011, and runs through March 12, 2018. My sample is restricted to include only days on which the settlement of the one-month currency forward occurs before the next FOMC meeting, excluding days with an FOMC meeting. Because the FOMC holds eight scheduled meetings each year, roughly one quarter of all non-weekend days are included in the dataset. My data on spot and forward exchange rates, FX options, and OIS rates are from Bloomberg. I use the London closing time for all of these instruments, following Du et al. (2018). I focus on the euro, yen, and pound, because these currencies are major currencies that are modeled explicitly in the Federal Reserve’s stress test scenarios, and the Australian dollar, which plays a role in the “carry trade.” For details of the data construction, see appendix section A.

Information on the “stress test” scenarios comes from the Federal Reserve’s website.26 The “severely adverse” scenario described in the tests shows, among other variables, the level of euro, yen, and pound, as well as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, at a quarterly frequency. I collect both the one and four-quarter percentage changes for each of the assets I study, and in my analysis will pretend that these are returns that occur over a one-month horizon. For AUD, which is not explicitly modeled in the stress test scenarios, I impute the returns in each stress scenario by running a daily regression predicting AUD returns using the contemporaneous GBP, EUR, JPY, and stock returns over the preceding 720 days, and then use these regression coefficients along with the one or four-quarter stress returns.

To conduct the tests described in the previous section, several additional assumptions are required. To construct the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio, I require a full variance-covariance matrix under the risk-neutral measure. I construct such a matrix from currency options on each currency possible currency pair. For details, see appendix section § A. To estimate that portfolio’s expected excess returns under the physical measure, an estimate of expected excess returns is required. Motivated by Meese and Rogoff (1983) and the related literature, I assume that exchange rates are random walks over my one-month horizon. As a result, the expected excess return of using the IOER rate and a forward to purchase, say, one yen one month from now, is the determined by the difference between the forward and spot exchange rate.

Table 1 presents the sample means and standard deviations of the arbitrage associated with each currency and the risk-free arbitrage. Conceptually, these statistics correspond to the term $\chi_a$ defined in (8). For example, for euros, it represents the percentage difference in price, in dollars today, of purchasing a single euro one month in the future by buying

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the euro at spot today and saving at OIS (the asset $a \in A^*$), and obtaining the same euro one month in the future by savings at the IOER rate and using a currency forward (the replicating portfolio). I also present the difference between the dollar OIS rate and IOER ($R_f$ vs. $R_f^I$). The arbitrages have a one month horizon, but are scaled to annualized values.

This table also shows the option-implied volatility and correlations of each currency (with respect to the US dollar). Finally, the table reports the empirical correlations between the currencies and both the SPDR ETF and the daily He et al. (2017) (HKM) intermediary capital factor, and the quanto-implied correlations between the currencies and the S&P 500 (as in Kremens and Martin (2019), see appendix section A for details). A positive correlation means appreciation relative to the dollar when the S&P 500 has positive returns.

From table 1, we can observe several notable features of the data. First, intermediaries are able to earn a higher rate of interest than households (IOER vs. OIS). However, the positive sign on the euro, pound, and yen arbitrages implies that it is more expensive for intermediaries to use derivatives to purchase e.g. a euro one month in the future in exchange for a dollar today than it is for intermediaries to use products also available to households. The opposite pattern holds for the Australian dollar. Note also that the euro and Australian dollar are positively correlated with the S&P 500 and the HKM factor, while the yen is negatively correlated with the S&P 500. Immediately, by proposition 2, we can observe that the AUD and JPY CIP violations do not have the expected sign, if either the S&P 500 or the HKM factor is a reasonable proxy for the externalities.

Figure 1 shows the time series of the “risk-neutral” excess arbitrages, $\chi_a - \chi_f$, for Australian dollar, euro, and yen in my sample. Using the risk-neutral excess arbitrage, as opposed to the physical measure excess arbitrage, eliminates the dependence on an estimate of expected returns. The magnitude of arbitrage is quite volatile, and there is significant positive co-movement between the euro and yen arbitrage.

## 5 Results

I begin by constructing the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio, using the euro, Australian dollar, and yen assets, and a risk-free asset. This portfolio can be constructed at daily frequency using definition 1 and data on the arbitrages and the risk-neutral variance-covariance matrix implied by FX options prices. Figure 2 displays the time series of the

\[27\] A version of the table with physical measure estimated volatilities and correlations is in appendix section B. The average volatilities and correlations are strikingly similar to their risk-neutral counterparts.
portfolio weights on the risky assets (EUR, AUD, JPY).

A few patterns in the data are apparent. First, the portfolio is generally long yen and euro and short AUD, and long currencies overall. That is, the portfolio is short US dollars and short the carry trade. The “short US dollars” part is likely to generate positive expected returns, whereas the “short the carry trade” generates negative expected returns, and this latter effect will dominate (see table 2 below). Interpreted through the lens of the model, this portfolio implies that a strong desire to transfer wealth from households to intermediaries (negative externalities) coincides with an appreciation of the US dollar and high returns for the carry trade. If we assume that the planner would like to transfer wealth to intermediaries in “bad times,” the first part seems sensible, in light of the safe haven role of the US dollar (see, e.g., Maggiori (2017)), but the second is surprising. Lustig and Verdellhan (2007) show that negative carry trade returns are associated with falls in consumption, and we would generally presume that these times are times when the planner would like intermediaries to have relatively more wealth. Second, the noticeable spikes in the euro and yen CIP deviations that occur around quarter- and year-end result in large changes to the portfolio weight. This is not surprising, as there is no corresponding large change in implied volatilities that would offset the effect. Interpreted through the lens of the model, suddenly binding constraints could only be justified by large changes in externalities, and hence in the externality-mimicking portfolio.

I next consider the predictions that this portfolio has about other arbitrages. I deliberately excluded GBP from the set of currencies used to form the externality-mimicking portfolio. This allows me to test whether the arbitrage predicted using the externality-mimicking portfolio is consistent with the arbitrage actually observed for the dollar-pound currency pair. Formally, I compute

$$\chi_{GBP} - \chi_f = \sum_{GBP}^{\theta A^*,i^*} \theta A^*,i^*,$$

where $\theta A^*,i^*$ is the externality-mimicking portfolio in (9) and $\Sigma_{GBP}^{A^*,i^*}$ is the covariance, under the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, between the dollar-pound exchange rate and the risky assets used to form the externality-mimicking portfolio (EUR, AUD, JPY). This is equivalent to computing the excess arbitrage under the projected externalities, which will coincide with the arbitrage under the true externalities if there is no covariance between

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28In the terminology of Lustig et al. (2011), the portfolio is long the “level” factor and short the “slope” factor (the slope is with respect to interest rates).
the pound and the error term in the projection.

Figure 3 displays the results graphically. The actual excess arbitrage in pounds is constructed from OIS rates in dollars and pounds, and the spot and forward dollar-pound exchange rates (using excess arbitrage eliminates the dependence on the IOER rate). The predicted excess arbitrage is constructed entirely from those same variables in euros, AUD, and yen, along with options prices on all possible currency pairs, which are used to both construct the externality-mimicking portfolio (in the matrix $\Sigma^A_{i^*,i}I$) and to construct the covariances $\Sigma^A_{GBP_{i^*}}$. Note that the sets of financial instruments used to construct the actual and predicted excess arbitrages do not overlap. Nevertheless, the predicted and actual excess arbitrages track each other, except near the end of 2011. The $R^2$ of a regression of the actual arbitrage on the predicted arbitrage, with no constant, is 83%. For predictions involving other currencies, see appendix section B.1.

I next consider the expected return of this portfolio (the first test described in the previous section). Intuitively, because the portfolio is generally short the carry trade, the expected return on the portfolio is negative. This contradicts the intuition that the externalities should be negatively correlated with the SDF.

Figure 4 presents the time series of expected excess returns on the portfolio, and Table 2 formally tests whether the average expected return over my sample is greater than or equal to zero (a one-sided test). I show results for the full sample, only for dates for which the trade crosses a quarter-end, and only for dates for which the trade crosses a year-end.\textsuperscript{29} I also formally test whether the quarter-end dates are different from other dates, and whether the year-end dates are different from other quarter-end dates. Both Bech and Klee (2011), for fed funds vs. IOER, and Du et al. (2018), for CIP, have documented that the arbitrage spikes near quarter-ends. As these results demonstrate, the problem of negative expected returns documented above is particularly acute at quarter and year-ends.

I now turn to the second test, using the stress tests. Once per year, the Federal Reserve describes a “severely adverse” scenario and requires banks to maintain various leverage and capital ratios in this scenario. In Table 3, I present the returns of the yen, euro, and stocks in the stress test scenarios, at both the one quarter and four quarter horizons, for each stress test conducted. A general pattern emerges: recent stress tests have involved sizable euro depreciations relative to the dollar, and sizable yen appreciations. This pattern is consistent with the observation that, during my sample, stock market declines tend to

\textsuperscript{29}The trade crosses quarter/year end if the settlement dates of the spot and forward FX trades are before and after the end of some quarter/year, respectively.
coincide with euro depreciation and yen appreciation relative to the dollar, and that these sorts of correlations might influence how the Federal Reserve constructs the stress test scenarios. The stock return itself very negative in all of these scenarios.

The scenarios do not specify a return for the Australian dollar, presumably because it would be virtually impossible to the specify the returns of every asset a bank might hold. I impute the return of the AUD using the stress tests returns on euro, yen, and pounds (not shown in Table 3) and the stock market. Because of the Australian dollar’s positive correlation with the stock market and negative correlation with the yen, the imputed returns are quite negative. When banks calculate their stress scenario returns, they likely perform a similar kind of imputation.

Each of the stress test scenarios is associated with a particular date (listed in table 3) which is the date at which the scenario starts. For each date in my sample that is also within 180 calendar days of the stress test date, I report the returns of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio under the associated stress test scenario. Requiring that the relevant financial market data come from a day that is within 180 days of the stress test date effectively assigns almost all of the days in my sample to a single stress test per date, dropping only a handful of days that are far from any stress test date.

If regulation is optimal, we should expect that the returns of the externality-mimicking portfolio are negative. What I find in the data, however, is that this is not the case. At almost all points in time, the portfolio is long low-interest-rate currencies (EUR and/or JPY) and short high-interest-rate currencies (AUD), and as a result has positive returns in the stress scenario, because the carry trade performs poorly in the stress scenario.

Table 4 formally tests whether returns are negative, averaging across dates near a particular stress test. The p-values correspond to a one-sided test that the mean is less than or equal to zero. I am able to reject the hypothesis that returns are negative on average for all four stress test years beginning in 2014.

In summary, the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio has negative expected returns and positive returns in the stress scenario, which is the exact opposite of what we would expect under the presumption that the planner would like intermediaries to have more wealth relative to households in bad states as opposed to good states.

On possible explanation, of course, is that the goal of regulation is to encourage intermediaries to take more, not less, macro-prudential risk, and regulatory policy is in fact accomplishing its goals. A more likely explanation, in my view, is that the current regulatory apparatus is not accomplishing its macro-prudential objectives.
Du et al. (2018) shows that the direction of the CIP arbitrage across currencies is predicted by the direction of the carry trade. A simple interpretation of this fact is that households or their proxies want to do the carry trade, and intermediaries are induced by the arbitrage to take the other side. Leverage constraints, such as the “supplementary leverage ratio,” prevent the intermediaries from fully satisfying households’ demands. If this story is correct, households are trying to take macro-economic risk and insure intermediaries from those risks, but regulation (the leverage ratio) is limiting this risk transfer, which is the exact opposite of what an optimal policy would do.

For robustness, appendix section B presents three sets of additional results. The first set uses the physical measure externality-mimicking portfolio instead of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio in the stress test exercise. These results show that the estimated physical and risk-neutral measure covariance matrices are similar, and that the stress test results do not depend on the choice of reference measure. Appendix section A.2 discusses the construction of the portfolio and appendix section B.2 presents the results.

The second set of results incorporates an equity-based arbitrage between the SPDR ETF and SPY options into the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio. The purpose of this robustness exercise is to demonstrate that the puzzling results of the main analysis are not driven by the choice of arbitrages to include in the portfolio. Including the SPDR-SPY arbitrage in the externality-mimicking portfolio increases both the complexity and data requirements of the exercise, and the noisiness of the results due to the imprecision in the measurement of the arbitrage. For these reasons, I do not include it in the main analysis. With this arbitrage included, the results of the expected return test are broadly unchanged—expected returns are robustly negative, contrary to expectations. The results for the stress test are “better,” in that more but not all of the stress returns are sharply negative. This effect is driven by the combination of very negative equity returns in the stress scenario and a small positive SPDR-SPY arbitrage (on average). The data is described in appendix sections A.3 and A.4 and the results are presented in appendix section B.3.

The third and final set of results uses “carry” and “dollar” portfolios of currencies instead of individual currencies. These results support the interpretation that the externality-mimicking portfolio is short USD (which was expected) and short the carry trade (which was not expected). The negative expected returns and positive returns in the stress scenario that I document are due to the short carry aspect of the portfolio. The portfolios are

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30These results taken together suggest that the stress returns might not be negative enough. Just because the returns in the stress scenario are negative does not mean macro-prudential regulation is working optimally.
described in appendix section A.5 and the results are presented in appendix section B.4.

6 Conclusion

Under optimal policy, there is a close connection between the externalities regulation attempts to address and the arbitrage that regulation creates. Using this connection, we can assess whether macro-prudential policies are achieving their objectives. I develop a method of backing out a set of externalities that would rationalize a particular pattern of arbitrage across assets. This method constructs an externality-mimicking portfolio, whose returns are a projection of the externalities that would rationalize existing policy onto the space of returns. I argue that these externalities should negatively covary with the SDF, and be negative in “stress” scenarios. Using these intuitions, I develop two simple tests: does the externality-mimicking portfolio have positive expected returns, and does it have negative returns in the Federal Reserve’s stress tests? I show, in current data, using currencies, the answer to both these questions is no, implying an inconsistency in current regulatory policy.

References


**Tables and Figures**

**Figure 1: Time Series of Excess Arbitrage**

Notes: This figure plots the annualized excess arbitrage $\chi_a - \chi_f$, as defined as in (8), for the yen, euro, and Australian dollar. These excess arbitrages are approximately equal to the one month OIS-based CIP violation vs. USD for those currencies. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.
Figure 2: Externality-Mimicking Portfolio Weights

Notes: This figure plots the portfolio weights of the externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1). The portfolio is constructed using a set of arbitrage-able assets $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The reference measure is the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, meaning that expected returns are equal to the IOER rate and the variance-covariance matrix is inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.

Figure 3: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Pounds

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized pound excess arbitrage $\chi_{GBP} - \chi_I$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based GBP-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.
Figure 4: Risk-Neutral EMP Expected Returns

Notes: This figure plots the excess expected return under the physical measure of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1), under the assumption that currencies follow a random walk. The excess return is censored at +/- 200bps to enhance readability. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.

Table 1: Summary Statistics for Arbitrage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pounds</th>
<th>Euros</th>
<th>Yen</th>
<th>Aus. Dollar</th>
<th>OIS-IOER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage Mean (bps/year)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage SD (bps/year)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Vol. (bps/year)</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Pound/USD</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Euro/USD</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Yen/USD</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with SPDR</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with HKM</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Corr. with S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the sample of all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. Arbitrage mean $\chi_\alpha$ is defined using (8) for a claim to e.g. one euro in one month, priced in dollars today. The OIS-IOER arbitrage is the risk-free arbitrage, based on a claim to one dollar in one month. Arbitrage SD is the daily standard deviation of $\chi_\alpha$. OI Vol. and OI Corr. variables for currencies are the time-series mean of a daily series extracted from variance-covariance matrices implied by currency options. Empirical Corr. with SPDR and Empirical Corr. with HKM are the time-series means of the correlations between the currency returns and the SPDR ETF (which tracks the S&P 500) and with the He et al. (2017) daily intermediary capital factor, as estimated on a rolling basis by the methodology described in appendix section A.2. Implied Corr. with S&P 500 is based on the time-series mean of the currency correlation with the S&P 500 extracted from quanto options and described in appendix section A.4.
Table 2: Risk-Neutral EMP Expected Returns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (bps)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (bps)</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>-222</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter-Ends</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-431</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-Ends</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-1005</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QE - NQE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-321</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YE - NYE QE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-816</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the excess expected return under the physical measure of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1), under the assumption that currencies follow a random walk. The portfolio is constructed from an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is inferred from currency options. The full sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. The quarter-end and year-end sub-samples are restricted to days on which a quarter- or year-end occurs between the spot FX settlement date and the one-month FX settlement date. The QE-NQE and YE-NYE QE rows report the mean difference between quarter-end vs. non-quarter-end dates and year-end vs. non-year-end quarter-end. Test indicates the hypothesis about the mean being tested, and P-Value reports the associated p-value.

Table 3: Stress Test “Severely Adverse” Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>Euro One-Quarter Return</th>
<th>Euro Four-Quarter Return</th>
<th>Stocks One-Quarter Return</th>
<th>Stocks Four-Quarter Return</th>
<th>Yen One-Quarter Return</th>
<th>Yen Four-Quarter Return</th>
<th>AUD* One-Quarter Return</th>
<th>AUD* Four-Quarter Return</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>-19.3</td>
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<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-24.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
<td>-28.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-16.3</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-23.7</td>
<td>-32.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the percentage changes in the level of the euro, yen, and the Dow Jones Total Stock Market Index (“Stocks”) during the first one or four quarters of the associated “Severely Adverse Scenario” from that year’s stress test. These percentage changes are treated as returns in my analysis. Stress Test Date lists the date on which that year’s scenario begins. AUD shows the imputed return for the Australian dollar, using the imputation method described in the text.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (1Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (1Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value (1Q)</th>
<th>Mean (4Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (4Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value (4Q)</th>
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<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<td>0.9838</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/30/14</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>0.0000</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/31/16</td>
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<td>0.0000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0000</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of stress test scenario returns for the risk-neutral externality-nimicking portfolio portfolio. The risk-neutral EMP portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is computed from currency options prices. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting and within 180 days of a stress test date. Each of these dates is assigned to the nearest stress test date. N reports the number of dates assigned to each stress test, and P-Value reports the p-value associated with a one-sided hypothesis test that the mean return is negative. Results are reported for both one-quarter (1Q) and four-return (4Q) returns from the stress test scenarios.
Internet Appendix

A Details on Data Construction

A.1 The Risk-Neutral Variance-Covariance Matrix

The risk-neutral variance-covariance matrix $\Sigma^*,I,i^*$ is defined as variance-covariance matrix, under the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, of the returns $R^I_{a,s}$. In the case of currencies, these are the returns of investing at the IOER rate for one month and using a currency forward to purchase, say, yen, and then immediately exchanging back to dollars the spot rate. Let $S_{j,t}$ be the spot exchange rate of currency $j$ per dollar (e.g. euros per dollar, yen per dollar), and let $F_{j,t}$ be the one-month forward rate. The empirical analog of the return $R^I_{a,s}$ is

$$R_{j,t} = R^I_{f,t} \frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}},$$

where $R^I_{f,t}$ is the gross IOER rate accumulated over the one-month time horizon. Note that, because $R^I_{f,t}$ is the risk-free rate available to intermediaries, we must have $E^*_{t}(\frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}}) = 1$ where $E^*$ denotes expectations taken under the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure.

To construct the risk-neutral variance-covariance matrix of currency returns, I use daily, London-closing at-the-money 1-month implied volatilities from Bloomberg for each currency pair. The volatilities are “percentage” volatilities from a log-normal Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) model. If $S_{j,t}$ and $S'_{j,t}$ are two exchange rates vs. the US dollar at time $t$ (e.g. euros per dollar and yen per dollar), then

$$Cov^*[\Delta s_{j,t+1}, \Delta s'_{j,t+1}] = \frac{1}{2} (V^*[\Delta s_{j,t+1}] + V^*[\Delta s'_{j,t+1}] - V^*[\Delta s_{j,t+1} - \Delta s'_{j,t+1}])$$

where $\Delta s_{j,t} = \ln(\frac{S_{j,t+1}}{S_{j,t}})$ and $Cov^*$ and $V^*$ denote the risk-neutral variance and covariance, respectively. Under the assumption of log-normality,

$$Cov^*_{t}[\frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}}, \frac{S'_{j,t}}{S'_{j,t+1}}] = E^*[\exp(-\Delta s_{j,t+1} - \Delta s'_{j,t+1})] - E^*[\exp(-\Delta s_{j,t+1})]E^*[\exp(-\Delta s'_{j,t+1})]$$

$$= \frac{S_{j,t}S'_{j,t}}{F_{j,t}F'_{j,t}} (\exp(Cov^*[\Delta s_{j,t+1}, \Delta s'_{j,t+1}]) - 1),$$
where $F_{1,t}$ and $F_{2,t}$ are the forward rates. It follows that

$$
A_{j,j',t} = (R_{f,j})^2 \left( \exp \left( \frac{1}{2} V_t [\Delta s_{j,j'+1}] + V_t [\Delta s_{j',j+1}] - V_t [\Delta s_{j,j+1} - \Delta s_{j',j+1}] \right) - 1 \right).
$$

In theory, I should make an adjustment to Bloomberg implied volatilities to use a discount rate associated with the IOER rate, instead of the more standard OIS rate. However, the difference amounts to about one basis point in the option price, and hence is negligible. I have also experimented with more sophisticated methods of computing the risk-neutral variance-covariance matrix (the “SVIX” method of Martin (2017)). Such methods avoid log-normality assumptions at the expense of additional data requirements and complexity, and have little impact on my results.

## A.2 The Physical Expected Returns and Variance-Covariance Matrix

Expected returns under the physical measure are required both to conduct the expected returns test described in the text and to construct the physical measure externality-mimicking portfolio. The latter also requires an estimate of the physical measure variance-covariance matrix of returns.

As described in the text, I assume that currencies are random walks. Specifically, I assume log-normal exchange rates and that the log-exchange rate is a martingale. The expected excess return of using the IOER rate and a forward to purchase, say, one yen one month from now, is determined by the difference between the forward and expected exchange rate. That is,

$$
\mu_{A^*,I,p}^{j,j',t} = R_{f,j} E_t \left[ \frac{F_{j,j'+1}}{S_{j,j'+1}} \right],
$$

where $S_{t+1}$ is the exchange rate in foreign currency per dollar, $F_{j}$ is the one-month forward rate, $R_{f,j}$ is the IOER rate accumulated over the next month, and expectations are taken under the physical measure. Under the stated assumptions,

$$
\mu_{A^*,I,p}^{j,j',t} = R_{f,j} F_{j,j'+1} \exp \left( \frac{1}{2} V_t [\Delta s_{j,j'+1}] \right)
$$

where $V_t [\Delta s_{t+1}]$ is the conditional variance of the log change in the exchange rate. Consequently, armed with an estimate for $V_t [\Delta s_{t+1}]$, we can construct expected returns.

I estimate a daily physical-measure variance-covariance matrix using an exponentially weighted moving average of the daily series, with a decay factor of 0.97 (a procedure
known as the “RiskMetrics” methodology, see for example Alexander (2008)). This avoids using future information to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. I initialize my variance and covariance estimates at the beginning of 2011 with the realized variance/covariance for 2010. I then scale my daily estimated variance-covariance matrix to a one-month horizon.

I use this estimated variance-covariance matrix of log returns both construct my estimates of mean returns, as above, and to construct a variance-covariance matrix for arithmetic returns, as described in appendix section A.1, under the assumption of log-normality. In this case,

\[
Cov_t \left[ \frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}}, \frac{S_{j',t}}{S_{j',t+1}} \right] = E_t[\exp(-\Delta s_{j,t+1} - \Delta s_{j',t+1})] - E_t[\exp(-\Delta s_{j,t+1})]E_t[\exp(-\Delta s_{j',t+1})] \\
= \frac{\mu^{A^*,I,p}_{j,t} \mu^{A^*,I,p}_{j',t} S_{j,t} S_{j',t}}{(R^I\text{t}_{j,t})^2 F_{j,t} F_{j',t}} (\exp(Cov_t[\Delta s_{j,t+1}, \Delta s_{j',t+1}]) - 1)
\]

and

\[
\Sigma^{A^*,I,p}_{j,j',t} = (\mu^{A^*,I,p}_{j,t} \mu^{A^*,I,p}_{j',t}) (\exp(\frac{1}{2}(V_t[\Delta s_{j,t+1}] + V_t[\Delta s_{j',t+1}] - V_t[\Delta s_{j,t+1} - \Delta s_{j',t+1}])) - 1).
\]

A.3 The SPDR ETF/SPY Option Arbitrage

In this section, I describe an equity-related arbitrage that I include in a robustness exercise. The arbitrage I consider is an arbitrage between the SPDR S&P 500 ETF and options on that ETF, which trade on the CBOE under the ticker SPY. This arbitrage is closely related to the classic index-future arbitrage involving S&P 500 futures (e.g. Chung (1991); MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988); Miller et al. (1994)).

The arbitrage I study considers the cost of purchasing a share of the SPDR ETF and holding it for one month as compared to the cost of purchasing that ETF via put-call parity (by buying a call and selling a put with a one month horizon). The ETF share itself is the arbitrage-able asset (both because it is easily purchased by households and because regulations affect intermediaries’ trade in equity shares). The intermediary, to replicate the ETF, can buy a call on the ETF, sell a put on the ETF at the same strike, and invest enough cash at the IOER rate over the next month to cover the exercise price of the put/call. Regardless of whether the ETF ends up above or below the strike price, the intermediary

\footnote{More sophisticated approaches that incorporate higher-frequency data might yield better results. See, for example, Ghysels et al. (2006).}
will end up owning the ETF in one month.

The particular details of this arbitrage are complicated by the fact that the SPY options are “American” and not “European” options, meaning they can be exercised at any time. I deal with this issue by employing the Margrabe (1978) bound on American put prices, which in my setting (short time horizons and low interest rates) is reasonably tight. I discuss this issue in more detail below.

The ETF and the replicating portfolio will generate identical payoffs as long as there are no dividends over the course of the month (more precisely, that an ex-dividend date does not occur within the month). The ETF has ex-dividend dates quarterly, usually on the third Friday of March, June, September, and December.\textsuperscript{32} I therefore limit my sample to avoid these dates. This illustrates one of the two main advantages the ETF-based arbitrage has over the traditional S&P 500 cash-futures arbitrage. The stocks of the S&P 500 index pay dividends often, and hence most studies of index arbitrage assume either perfect foresight of dividends or use a dividend forecast, whereas no such assumptions are required for the ETF arbitrage. The second advantage relates to transactions costs and stale prices. The traditional index arbitrage involves buying and selling 500 stocks, generating substantial transactions costs and exacerbating the issue that prices might not be synchronized. Using the ETF, which is one of the most actively traded securities in the equity market and has a very small bid-offer, mitigates many of these issues. Of course, synchronizing the options prices and the ETF price is still critically important, as in Van Binsbergen et al. (2012).

For this arbitrage, I am assuming that the costs associated with posting margin on the options are negligible. That is, the margin is sufficiently small, and the interest rate the intermediary receives on the posted margin sufficiently close to the IOER rate, that these costs are negligible. This assumption is also, implicitly, being applied to the margin required by counterparties in the OTC market for FX swaps when studying CIP violations.

Because the SPY options are American, not European, I construct arbitrage bounds as opposed to a single arbitrage measure. It is straightforward to observe that an American call or put must be weakly more valuable than its European counterpart, but the possibility of early exercise implies that this weak inequality might be strict.

Let $p_a(K) \in A$ and $c_a(K) \in A$ denote the American put and American call of strike $K$. Following the argument of Margrabe (1978), let $\hat{p}_a(K)$ be an American put option to exchange the ETF for an amount that grows at the IOER rate, $K \exp(t \cdot \ln(R_f^t))$, where $t$ is

\textsuperscript{32}The prospectus, available at https://us.spdrs.com/library-content/public/SPDR_500%20TRUST_PROSPECTUS.pdf, describes the details of how the ex-dividend dates are determined.
the time of the exchange. Because the option matures prior to the next FOMC meeting, the IOER rate is assumed to be constant. Because the intermediary is always indifferent between buying the ETF and the risk-free bond, there is never any advantage to early exercise. Consequently, the put option $\hat{p}_a$ has the same value as a European style put option with the same expiry and a strike $KR^I_f$. Moreover, because $R^I_f \geq 1$, the option $\hat{p}_a$ is more valuable than the American put $p_a$. Hence, by no-arbitrage, the following inequalities hold for the American put:

$$0 \leq Q_{p_e}(K) \leq Q_{p_a}(K) \leq Q_{\hat{p}_a}(K) = Q_{p_e(KR^I_f)},$$

where $p_e(K) \in A$ is the European put of strike $K$. Using essentially the same argument, let $\hat{c}_a$ be an American call option to buy the ETF in exchange for $\frac{K}{R^I_f} \exp(t \cdot \ln(R^I_f))$ dollars at time $t$. Early exercise is again never optimal, and hence this call’s value is equal to the European call with strike $K$ and the same expiry. Moreover, this call dominates the American call with strike $K$ and the same expiry, and hence early exercise is never optimal and the American and European calls have the same value. That is,

$$Q_{c_a}(K) = Q_{c_e}(K),$$

where $c_e(K) \in A$ is the European call of strike $K$.

Let us now consider how to replicate the ETF. If I observed European options prices, I would calculate the arbitrage, for any strike $K$, as

$$\chi_e = \frac{Q_{c_e}(K) - Q_{p_e}(K) + \frac{K}{R^I_f} - Q_e}{Q_{c_e}(K) - Q_{p_e}(K) + \frac{K}{R^I_f}}.$$

where $Q_e$ is the ETF price. Using the put inequalities derived above,

$$\chi_e \geq \chi_{e,\text{min}}(K) = \frac{Q_{c_a}(K) - Q_{p_a}(K) + \frac{K}{R^I_f} - Q_e}{Q_{c_a}(K) - Q_{p_a}(K) + \frac{K}{R^I_f}},$$

and, for $K' = \frac{K}{R^I_f}$,

$$\chi_e \leq \frac{Q_{c_a(K'R^I_f)} - Q_{p_a(K')} + K' - Q_e}{Q_{c_a(K'R^I_f)} - Q_{p_a(K')} + K'}.$$

(12)
If $R_f^I$ is sufficiently close to one (and one month’s worth of interest is indeed quite small), these bounds will be tight.

One implementation issue that arises from these inequalities is that the strike $KR_f^I$ is unlikely to be traded. However, by the convexity of call prices (another cashflow dominance argument),

$$Q_{c_e}(KR_f^I) \leq \alpha Q_{c_e}(K_1) + (1 - \alpha) Q_{c_e}(K_2)$$

for any $K_1 \leq KR_f^I \leq K_2$ such that $\alpha K_1 + (1 - \alpha) K_2 = KR_f^I$. Choosing $K_1$ and $K_2$ to be as close as possible to $KR_f^I$ generates the tightest bound. If $KR_f^I$ is greater than the maximum traded strike $K_{max}$, then $Q_{c_e}(KR_f^I) \leq Q_{c_e}(K_{max})$. Using these bounds along with (12) generates an implementable upper-bound, which I will call $\chi_{e,max}(K)$. Because these bounds must hold for all $K$, we are free to choose the greatest lower bound and least upper bound from the set of available strikes.

Another empirical issue to consider in the implementation of this trading strategy is whether to use bids and offers or mid-prices. Bid-offers are wide in options markets, and likely substantially overstate the bid-offer associated with “delta one” trades. That is, buying a call and selling a put together likely has a much smaller bid-offer than doing those trades separately. For this reason, authors such as van Binsbergen et al. (2019) use mid-prices. However, mid-prices can exhibit strange behavior when bid-offers are particularly wide (which is why those authors use outlier-robust methods of analysis). To deal with this issue, I consider only strikes $K$ with sufficiently small bid-offers. In particular, I restrict attention to values of $\chi_{e,min}(K)$ which the difference between the mid-price and the lowest bound that can be constructed from the various bids and offers is less than 0.05% of the spot price $Q_e$. Under this restriction, the lower bound $\chi_{e,min}(K)$ constructed from mid prices is at most 5bps too high in the worse-case scenario. Similarly, I require that the difference between $\chi_{e,max}(K)$ and the highest bound constructed from bids and offers be less than 0.05% of $Q_e$. From these two sets of valid strikes (one for $\chi_{e,min}$ and one for $\chi_{e,max}$), I choose the strikes that generate the tightest possible bounds on $\chi_e$.

After finding the maximum and minimum bounds, $\chi_{e,min}$ and $\chi_{e,max}$, I define the estimated arbitrage as

$$\chi_e = \begin{cases} 
\chi_{e,min} & \max(\chi_{e,min}, \chi_{e,max}) > \chi_{RF} \\
\chi_{e,max} & \min(\chi_{e,min}, \chi_{e,max}) < \chi_{RF} \\
\chi_{RF} & \text{otherwise}.
\end{cases}$$

In other words, I will assume that there is zero risk-neutral excess arbitrage ($\chi_e - \chi_{RF}$) if
this is possible, and assume the minimum amount, in absolute value terms, if it is not possible.\textsuperscript{33} In practice, my final dataset never has $\chi_e = \chi_{RF}$, because the bounds are sufficiently tight.

The dataset is a high-frequency (minute-level) dataset of options quotes purchased from the CBOE DataShop. From this dataset (which contains quotes for all minutes the exchange is open), I have extracted the five minutes on each day immediately preceding the Bloomberg London closing time. On most days, this is 12:55pm-12:59pm EST, although the EST hour moves around due the asynchronous use of daylight savings time in the US and UK.

This dataset contains SPY options of many different expiries. Because I am interested in one-month options (where one-month is defined based on FX trading conventions) that do not cross an SPY dividend date, I restrict attention to expiries between 21 and 58 days in the future. These cutoffs ensure expiries are roughly one month and using these specific cutoffs simplifies the logic of determining whether an expiry occurs after the next ex-dividend date on the SPY. I also require that each expiry have at least eleven different strikes quoted to be included in the dataset.

The result of these restrictions and calculations is a dataset containing many estimates of $\chi_e$ on each day (five minutes times the number of valid expiries). From this set, for each day I search for minute/expiry pairs with non-missing data, expiries that cross neither the next SPY ex-dividend date nor the next FOMC meeting, and that have no arbitrage violations based on the bids and offers of options prices.\textsuperscript{34} Among the surviving minute/expiry pairs, I choose first the expiries that are closest to the FX market definition of one month, and then among those choose the minute-expiry pair with the narrowest bid-offer for the relevant arbitrage bounds. This procedures results in a unique value for $\chi_e$ on each day.

\section*{A.4 Expectations, Variance, and Covariance with the SPDR Arbitrage}

To use the SPY arbitrage described in the preceding sub-section in my exercise, I require estimates of its variance and covariance with currency returns under both the physical and risk-neutral measures, as well as an estimate of its expected return under the physical measure.

\textsuperscript{33}Note that, because I am using mid prices, it is possible to have $\bar{\chi}_{e,\min} > \bar{\chi}_{e,\max}$.

\textsuperscript{34}This last filter eliminates a few days with bad options quotes.
I use, as an empirical analog of the one-month return $R_{a,s} = (1 - \chi_a)R_{a,s}$,

$$R_{e,t} = (1 - \chi_{e,t-1}) \frac{Q_{e,t}}{Q_{e,t-1}},$$

where $Q_{e,t}$ is the spot SPY price. Note that this definition does not include dividends, because I have restricted attention to dates on which dividends will not occur over the next month.

To compute expected returns under the physical measure, I assume an equity premium of 5% (roughly the average value of Martin (2017) in recent years). Although many predictors of time-varying equity returns have been documented in the literature, over a one-month horizon most of these predictors are quite weak, and it seems reasonable to use an estimate of the unconditional equity premium. Under this assumption,

$$\mu_t^{A^*,f,p} = (1 - \chi_{e,t})(R_{f,t} - 1 + 1.05^\Delta t),$$

where $\Delta t$ is the time (in years) to the next month under the FX market convention and $R_{f,t}$ is the US OIS rate accumulated over that month.

To compute the physical-measure variance-covariance matrix, I use a daily series of surprise log-returns,

$$r_{e,t} = \ln(Q_{e,t}) - \ln(Q_{e,t-1}) - \ln(R_{f,t} - 1 + 1.05^\Delta t),$$

consistent with how I construct surprise currency returns. I then use the same “Risk-Metrics” methodology described in appendix section A.2.

I compute the risk-neutral variance-covariance matrix using the SVIX method of Martin (2017) and data on quanto options from Markit (as in Kremens and Martin (2019)). Applying the SVIX methodology of Martin (2017) (in particular, equation (11) of that paper) to the SPY options data used to construct the arbitrage series $\chi_e$, I compute $V_{f,t-1}^*[\frac{Q_{e,t}}{Q_{e,t-1}}]$, and then scale by $(1 - \chi_{e,t-1})^2$ to compute the variance.

I extract covariances from data on quanto options on the S&P 500. A quanto call option is, for example, the right to buy the S&P 500 for a fixed amount of euros at a certain date. Such options are traded in OTC markets, and Markit provides a pricing service to help dealers that trade these options mark their books. The prices represent the (trimmed, cleaned) averages of prices submitted by participating dealers. My data set includes prices for call and put options for all of currencies used in this paper. Unfortunately, these options...
have a twenty-four month expiry (this is essentially the only traded expiry), and the data is
monthly rather than daily. I discuss how I deal with both of these issues below. My use of
the quanto options is also complicated by the presence of arbitrage (CIP violations). I deal
with this issue by pricing the options under the assumptions of the framework developed in
this paper, and then extracting a risk-neutral covariance from those pricing formulas.

Let $S_{j,t}$ be the spot exchange rate (e.g. euros per dollar). The dollar price of a quanto
call ($qc$) option, as a percentage of the spot price, with a strike equal to the current spot
price is

$$qc_{j,t} = \frac{1}{R_{f,j,t+24}^t E_t^*[\frac{X_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+24}} \max\{Q_{e,t+24} - Q_e, 0\}]} Q_e,$$

where $X_{j,t}$ is the agreed-upon fixed exchange rate for the quanto option and $R_{f,j,t+24}^t$ is the
intermediaries’ cumulative discount factor over the next two years. The Markit data use the
convention $X_{j,t} = S_{j,t}$.

Quanto-put (qp) prices follow an analogous formula, and by put-call parity, for the
strikes in my data,

$$R_{f,j,t+24}^t (qc_{j,t} - qp_{j,t}) = E_t^*[\frac{S_{j,t}Q_{e,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}Q_e}] - E_t^*[\frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+24}}].$$

My data also includes hypothetical prices for quanto call and put options under the assump-
tion of zero correlation between the foreign exchange rate and the S&P 500. Under this
assumption, the price of the quanto call with $X_{j,t} = S_{j,t}$ is

$$zc_{j,t} = E_t^*[\frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+24}}] \times \frac{1}{R_{f,j,t+24}^t E_t^*[\max\{Q_{e,t+24} - Q_e, 0\}]} Q_e,$$

and hence is equal to the (inverse) forward premium multiplied by the price of the vanilla
(standard) call option on the S&P 500. That is, by asking for “zero-correlation” quanto call
prices, Markit is not asking dealers to price a new exotic instrument but rather to report the
levels of two standard contracts along with the the price of the quanto call option.

Again by put-call parity,

$$R_{f,j,t+24}^t (zc_{j,t} - zp_{j,t}) = E_t^*[\frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+24}}]E_t^*[\frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{Q_e}] - E_t^*[\frac{S_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+24}}],$$

where $zp_{j,t}$ is the zero-correlation quanto put price.
It follows that

$$E_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} F_{j,t+24} \right] = \frac{1 + F_{j,t+24} R_l^t}{S_{j,t+24}} \left( q c_{j,t} - q p_{j,t} \right) \left( q c_{j,t} - q p_{j,t} \right),$$

where $F_{j,t+24}$ is the two-year forward price.

As mentioned previously, the quanto dataset is a monthly dataset (with a few missing observations) of 24-month expiry options. The goal of this exercise is to extract one-month horizon covariances. To that end, I assume that correlations are constant over horizon, so that I can extract a 24-month risk-neutral correlation and then assume it is equal to the one-month correlation. I will use the most recent non-missing observation for each currency. In the data, the correlations I extract move slowly over time.

Ignoring these issues for a moment, the quantity of interest is

$$\Sigma_{j,e,t} = E_t^*[R_{e,t+1} R_{j,t+1} - E_t^*[R_{e,t+1}] E_t^*[R_{j,t+1}],$$

where $R_{j,t}$ is the intermediary currency return defined in A.1. This is

$$\Sigma_{j,e,t} = \left( 1 - x_{e,t} \right) R_{f,t} E_t^*[Q_{e,t+1}] \text{COV}_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+1}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+1}]} \frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}} \right]$$

$$= (R_{f,t}^l)^2 \text{Corr}_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+1}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+1}]} \frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}} \right] V_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+1}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+1}]} \right]^2 V_t^* \left[ \frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}} \right]^2. \quad (14)$$

Under the assumption that correlations are constant across horizon,

$$\text{Corr}_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+1}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+1}]} \frac{F_{j,t}}{S_{j,t+1}} \right] = \frac{\text{COV}_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} \frac{F_{j,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}} \right]}{V_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} \right]^2 V_t^* \left[ \frac{F_{j,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}} \right]^2} = \frac{E_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} \frac{F_{j,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}} \right]}{V_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} \right]^2 V_t^* \left[ \frac{F_{j,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}} \right]^2} - 1. \quad (15)$$

I compute risk-neutral variances $V_t^* \left[ \frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]} \right]$ and $V_t^* \left[ \frac{F_{j,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}} \right]$ from Bloomberg at-the-money 2-year at-the-money SPX implied volatilities and 2-year FX volatilities (implicitly assuming log-normality). As discussed earlier, using an SVIX-based calculation would avoid log-normality assumptions at the expense of increased data requirements, computational complexity, and uncertainty related to bid-offers and illiquidity of out-of-the-money.
options. Under an assumption of log-normality,

\[ V_t^*[\frac{Q_{e,t+24}}{E_t^*[Q_{e,t+24}]}] = \exp(V_t^*[\ln(Q_{e,t+24})]) - 1, \]

and likewise

\[ V_t^*[\frac{F_{j,t,t+24}}{S_{j,t+24}}] = \exp(V_t^*[\ln(S_{j,t+24})]) - 1. \]

One last implementation concerns the intermediaries’ two-year discount factor, \( R_{f,t,t+24}^I \). In the main text, I study only dates at least one month before an FOMC meeting and use the IOER rate as the one-month rate. This approach does not allow me to construct a two-year rate. For simplicity, I use instead the two-year OIS rate and then add the sample mean spread between IOER and fed funds (see Table 1). This adjustment makes almost no difference to the estimated correlations. van Binsbergen et al. (2019) offer a better approach: extracting a two-year intermediary discount factor using “box” trades (put-call parity for different strikes). As with the SVIX methodology, this approach is theoretically superior but increases data requirements and concerns about issues related to illiquidity, bid-offer spreads, and the like.

### A.5 Construction of the Dollar and Carry Portfolios

As an additional robustness exercise, I construct an externality-mimicking portfolio under the assumption that \( A^* \) includes a risk-free asset and two portfolios of currency trades, which I will refer to as dollar and carry.

These portfolios are portfolios of five developed-market currencies vs. the US dollar. The five currencies (plus the US dollar) in the portfolio are: euro, yen, pound, Australian dollar, and Canadian dollar. To select these currencies, I started with the nine non-US-dollar G10 currencies. I removed the New Zealand dollar, Swedish krona, and Norwegian Krone due to limited data availability for FX options and OIS swaps. I removed the Swiss franc both because of problems with its OIS rate (discussed in Du et al. (2020)) and because of the pegging and de-pegging events that occur during the sample period.

From these five non-USD currencies, I define the dollar and carry portfolios, in the spirit of the factor approach of Lustig et al. (2011). Dollar is an equal-weighted basket of the five currencies vs. USD. Note that this portfolio is short USD vs. these other currencies, not long. This sign convention helps make the portfolio definition consistent with the exercise in the main text. Carry is a long-short portfolio that is long the two currencies...
with the smallest 1m forward premium and short the two countries with the largest forward
premium. For almost all of the sample, this means long AUD and CAD and short JPY and
EUR. To ensure a positive price, I add some of the risk-free USD investment to the Carry
portfolio. This has no effect on the excess arbitrage $\chi_{\text{carry}} - \chi_{\text{RF}}$, and hence no effect on
resulting externality-mimicking portfolio.

Expected returns and variance-covariance matrices for these portfolios can be con-
structed from the assumed expected returns and variance-covariance matrices of the in-
dividual currencies (as described in the previous parts of this appendix section). Because
some of the currencies in these portfolios are not explicitly modeled in the stress tests, I
impute returns using the same procedure used in the main text for AUD.

**B Additional Results**

**B.1 Predicted Arbitrage in Other Currencies**

This sub-section presents the predicted vs. actual arbitrage using the risk-neutral externality-
mimicking portfolio for three additional currencies: CAD, CHF, and SEK. These currencies
have enough OIS swap and options data available to make these predictions, although for
both CHF and SEK the sample size is reduced.
Figure 1: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Canadian Dollar

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized CAD excess arbitrage $\chi_{CAD} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based CAD-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.

Figure 2: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Swiss Franc

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized CHF excess arbitrage $\chi_{CHF} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based CHF-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting. The two vertical lines indicate the beginning and end of a period during which CHF was pegged to EUR.
Figure 3: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Swedish Krona

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized SEK excess arbitrage $\chi_{\text{SEK}} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based SEK-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.

B.2 Results using the Physical Measure

This sub-section presents results using the physical-measure externality-mimicking portfolio, as described in appendix section A.2. Table 1 presents a version of the summary statistics table, with an estimated variance-covariance matrix in the place of an option-implied variance-covariance matrix. I then present the portfolio weights, predicted vs. actual GBP arbitrage, and stress test returns for the physical measure. The results are similar to their counterparts from the main text.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Physical-Measure Arbitrage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pounds</th>
<th>Euros</th>
<th>Yen</th>
<th>Aus. Dollar</th>
<th>OIS-IOER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage Mean (bps/year)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage SD (bps/year)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Vol. (bps/year)</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with Pound/USD</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with Euro/USD</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with Yen/USD</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with SPDR</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with HKM</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the sample of days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. Arbitrage mean \( x_a \) is defined using (8) for a claim to e.g. one euro in one month, priced in dollars today. The OIS-IOER arbitrage is the risk-free arbitrage, based on a claim to one dollar in one month. Arbitrage SD is the daily standard deviation of \( x_a \). Empirical Vol. and Empirical Corr. variables for currencies are the time-series means of the correlations between the currency returns, as estimated on a rolling basis by the methodology described in appendix section A.2. Empirical Corr. with SPDR and Empirical Corr. with HKM are the time-series means of the correlations between the currency returns and the SPDR ETF (which tracks the S&P 500) and with the He et al. (2017) daily intermediary capital factor, as estimated on a rolling basis by the methodology described in appendix section A.2.

Figure 4: Externality-Mimicking Portfolio Weights, Physical Measure

Notes: This figure plots the portfolio weights of the externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1). The portfolio is constructed using a set of arbitrage-able assets \( A^* \) that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The reference measure is the physical measure, meaning that expected returns calculated under the assumption that log exchange rates are random walks and the variance-covariance matrix is estimated using the RiskMetrics methodology. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.
Figure 5: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Pounds, Physical Measure

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized pound excess arbitrage $\chi_{GBP} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based GBP-USD CIP violation. The externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The reference measure is the physical measure, meaning that expected returns calculated under the assumption that log exchange rates are random walks and the variance-covariance matrix, as well as the covariances with the pound, is estimated using the RiskMetrics methodology. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.

Table 2: Physical Returns in Stress Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (1Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (1Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value (1Q)</th>
<th>Mean (4Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (4Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value (4Q)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9998</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9963</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/16</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0384</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of stress test scenario returns for the physical-measure externality-mimicking portfolio portfolio. The physical measure EMP portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset. The expected returns are calculated under the assumption that log exchange rates are random walks and the variance-covariance matrix is estimated using the RiskMetrics methodology. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting and within 180 days of a stress test date. Each of these dates is assigned to the nearest stress test date. N reports the number of dates assigned to each stress test, and P-value reports the p-value associated with a one-sided hypothesis test that the mean return is negative. Results are reported for both one-quarter (1Q) and four-return (4Q) returns from the stress test scenarios.
B.3 Results including Equity Arbitrage

This sub-section presents results for a risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio that incorporates JPY, EUR, and AUD arbitrages as well as the SPY-based arbitrage described in appendix section A.3 and the risk-free rate arbitrage. The covariances and expected returns under the physical measure used in this section are described in appendix section A.4.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Arbitrage including SPY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pounds</th>
<th>Euros</th>
<th>Yen</th>
<th>Aus. Dollar</th>
<th>SPY</th>
<th>OIS-IOER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage Mean (bps/year)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage SD (bps/year)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Vol. (bps/year)</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>1566</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Pound/USD</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Euro/USD</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Yen/USD</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with SPDR</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with HKM</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Corr. with S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the sample of all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. The SPY statistics are restricted to dates at least one month before a SPDR ex-dividend date. Arbitrage mean $\chi_a$ is defined using (8) for a claim to e.g. one euro in one month, priced in dollars today. The OIS-IOER arbitrage is the risk-free arbitrage, based on a claim to one dollar in one month. Arbitrage SD is the daily standard deviation of $\chi_a$. OI Vol. and OI Corr. variables for currencies are the time-series mean of a daily series extracted from variance-covariance matrices implied by currency options, SPY options, and quanto options. Empirical Corr. with SPDR and Empirical Corr. with HKM are the time-series means of the correlations between the currency returns and the SPDR ETF (which tracks the S&P 500) and with the He et al. (2017) daily intermediary capital factor, as estimated on a rolling basis by the methodology described in appendix section A.2. Implied Corr. with S&P 500 is based on the time-series mean of the currency correlation with the S&P 500 extracted from quanto options and described in appendix section A.4.
Figure 6: Risk-Neutral Externality-Mimicking Portfolio Weights with SPY

Notes: This figure plots the portfolio weights of the externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1). The portfolio is constructed using a set of arbitrage-able assets $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset and the SPDR ETF. The reference measure is the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, meaning that expected returns are equal to the IOER rate and the variance-covariance matrix is inferred from currency options, SPY options, and quanto options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting and one month before a SPDR ex-dividend date.

Figure 7: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Pounds, Risk-Neutral Measure with SPY

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized pound excess arbitrage $\chi_{GBP} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based GBP-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset and the SPDR ETF. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options, SPY options, and quanto options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting and one month before a SPDR ex-dividend date.
Table 4: Risk-Neutral EMP Expected Returns with SPY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (bps)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (bps)</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>-111</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter-Ends</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-425</td>
<td>125.9</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-Ends</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-1495</td>
<td>439.9</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QE - Full</td>
<td></td>
<td>-447.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YE - QE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1421</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the excess expected return under the physical measure of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1), under the assumption that currencies follow a random walk and with a 5% equity risk premium. The portfolio is constructed from an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset and the SPDR ETF. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is inferred from currency options, SPY options, and quanto options. The full sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting and one month before a SPDR ex-dividend date. The quarter-end and year-end sub-samples are restricted to days on which a quarter- or year-end occurs between the spot FX settlement date and the one-month FX settlement date. The QE-NQE and YE-NYE QE report the mean difference between quarter-end vs. non-quarter-end dates and year-end vs. non-year-end quarter-end. Test indicates the hypothesis about the mean being tested, and P-Value reports the associated p-value.

Table 5: Risk-Neutral Portfolio with SPY, Returns in Stress Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (1Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (1Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Mean (4Q,%)</th>
<th>S.D. (4Q,%)</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9989</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.9956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/13</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6786</td>
<td>-17.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.9999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/14</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.0304</td>
<td>-14.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/15</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4302</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-23.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-30.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.5013</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.9994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of stress test scenario returns for the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio portfolio. The risk-neutral EMP portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the yen, euro, and Australian dollar, as well as a risk-free asset and the SPDR ETF. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is computed from currency options prices, SPY options, and quanto options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting, one month before a SPDR ex-dividend date, and within 180 days of a stress test date. Each of these dates is assigned to the nearest stress test date. N reports the number of dates assigned to each stress test, and P-Value reports the p-value associated with a one-sided hypothesis test that the mean return is negative. Results are reported for both one-quarter (1Q) and four-return (4Q) returns from the stress test scenarios.

B.4 Results with Dollar and Carry Portfolios

This sub-section presents for a risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio that incorporates “Carry” and “Dollar” arbitrages, as well as a risk-free rate arbitrage. Carry and Dollar (defined in appendix section A.5) are portfolios of currency trades. Carry is long two low-forward-premium currencies (AUD and CAD for most of the sample) and short two high-forward-premium currencies (JPY and EUR for most of the sample). Dollar is an equally weighted portfolio of currencies vs. USD. Note when interpreting the results below that
Dollar is short USD, not long USD.

Table 6: Summary Statistics for Carry and Dollar Arbitrage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Carry</th>
<th>Dollar</th>
<th>OIS-IOER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage Mean (bps/year)</td>
<td>-44.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrage SD (bps/year)</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Vol. (bps/year)</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Carry</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI Corr. with Dollar</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with SPDR</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Corr. with HKM</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied Corr. with S&amp;P 500</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the sample of all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. Arbitrage mean $\chi_a$ is defined using (8) for a claim to e.g. one euro in one month, priced in dollars today. The OIS-IOER arbitrage is the risk-free arbitrage, based on a claim to one dollar in one month. Arbitrage SD is the daily standard deviation of $\chi_a$. The OI Vol. and OI Corr. variables are the time-series mean of a daily series extracted from variance-covariance matrices implied by currency options. Empirical Corr. with SPDR and Empirical Corr. with HKM are the time-series means of the correlations between the currency returns and the SPDR ETF (which tracks the S&P 500) and with the He et al. (2017) daily intermediary capital factor, as estimated on a rolling basis by the methodology described in appendix section A.2. Implied Corr. with S&P 500 is based on the time-series mean of the currency correlation with the S&P 500 extracted from quanto options and described in appendix section A.4.

Figure 8: Risk-Neutral Externality-Mimicking Portfolio Weights with Carry and Dollar

Notes: This figure plots the portfolio weights of the externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1). The portfolio is constructed using a set of arbitrage-able assets $A^*$ that contains the Carry and Dollar portfolios, as well as a risk-free asset. The reference measure is the intermediaries’ risk-neutral measure, meaning that expected returns are equal to the IOER rate and the variance-covariance matrix is inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.
Table 7: Risk-Neutral EMP Expected Returns with Carry and Dollar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (bps)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (bps)</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>-151</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter-Ends</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>-315</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-Ends</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-763</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QE - Full</td>
<td></td>
<td>-252</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YE - QE</td>
<td></td>
<td>-638</td>
<td></td>
<td>= 0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the excess expected return under the physical measure of the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio (definition 1), under the assumption that currencies follow a random walk. The portfolio is constructed from an $A^*$ that contains the Carry and Dollar portfolios, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is inferred from currency options. The full sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 at least one month before an FOMC meeting. The quarter-end and year-end sub-samples are restricted to days on which a quarter- or year-end occurs between the spot FX settlement date and the one-month FX settlement date. The QE-NQE and YE-NYE QE report the mean difference between quarter-end vs. non-quarter-end dates and year-end vs. non-year-end quarter-end. Test indicates the hypothesis about the mean being tested, and P-Value reports the associated p-value.

Figure 9: Actual vs. Predicted Excess Arbitrage in Pounds, Risk-Neutral Measure with Carry and Dollar

Notes: This figure plots excess the annualized pound excess arbitrage $\chi_{GBP} - \chi_f$, as defined in (8), along with the predicted value defined as in (11). The excess arbitrage is approximately equal to the one month OIS-based GBP-USD CIP violation. The risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the Carry and Dollar portfolios, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation and the covariances with the pound are inferred from currency options. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting.
Table 8: Stress Test “Severely Adverse” Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>Carry* Imputed</th>
<th>Dollar* Imputed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One-Quarter Return</td>
<td>Four-Quarter Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/13</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/14</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/15</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/16</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>-18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/17</td>
<td>-23.6</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the imputed returns of the Carry and Dollar portfolios during the first one or four quarters of the associated “Severely Adverse Scenario” from that year’s stress test, using the imputation method described in the text. Stress Test Date lists the date on which that year’s scenario begins.

Table 9: Risk-Neutral Portfolio with Carry and Dollar, Returns in Stress Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stress Test Date</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean (1Q, %)</th>
<th>S.D. (1Q, %)</th>
<th>P-value (1Q)</th>
<th>Mean (4Q, %)</th>
<th>S.D. (4Q, %)</th>
<th>P-value (4Q)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/30/12</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/30/14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1707</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9992</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/16</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/31/17</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of stress test scenario returns for the risk-neutral externality-mimicking portfolio. The risk-neutral EMP portfolio is constructed with an $A^*$ that contains the Carry and Dollar portfolios, as well as a risk-free asset. The variance-covariance matrix used in the computation is computed from currency options prices. The sample is all US trading days from Jan 4, 2011 to March 12, 2018 that are at least one month before an FOMC meeting and within 180 days of a stress test date. Each of these dates is assigned to the nearest stress test date. N reports the number of dates assigned to each stress test, and P-Value reports the p-value associated with a one-sided hypothesis test that the mean return is negative. Results are reported for both one-quarter (1Q) and four-return (4Q) returns from the stress test scenarios.

C General Equilibrium with Intermediaries

This appendix section describes a general equilibrium endowment economy with incomplete markets (GEI) that features a distinction between households and intermediaries. It is an endowment economy\textsuperscript{35} version of the economy studied by Farhi and Werning (2016), with a specific asset structure that I will introduce below.

\textsuperscript{35}For simplicity, I also assume flexible prices and a simpler form of constraints on government transfers.
The economy has a set of future states, $S_1$, and an initial state, $s_0$. Let $S = S_1 \cup \{s_0\}$ denote the set of all states, and let $J_s$ be the set of goods in each state $s \in S$. The government can transfer income between agents in the initial state, $s_0$, but not any other state, and these transfers must sum to zero. The goods available in each state are denoted by the set $J_s$.\(^{36}\)

Households $h \in H$ maximize expected utility,

$$
\sum_{s \in S} U^h(\{X^h_{js} : j \in J_s; s\}),
$$

where $U^h(\{X^h_{js} : j \in J_s; s\})$ is the utility of household $h$ in state $s$, inclusive of the household’s rate of time preference and the probability the household places on state $s$. I will assume non-satiation for at least one good in each state, implying that each household places non-zero probability on each state in $S_1$, and that the utility functions are differentiable. Note that I will refer to each $h$ as “a household,” and assume price-taking; nothing would change if we thought of each $h$ as representing a mass of identical households. In each state $s \in S$, household $h \in H$ has an endowment of good $j \in J_s$ equal to $Y^h_{js}$. In state $s_0$, the household might also receive a transfer $T^h$.

The set of securities available in the economy, $A$, has securities which offer payoffs $Z_{a,s}(\{P_{js} : j \in J_s\})$ for security $a \in A$ in state $s \in S$. Note that the payoff may be a function of goods prices, which are endogenous, and I will assume that the payoffs are homogenous of degree one in prices, so that it is without loss of generality to fix the price for one good (the numeraire) in each state. Let $D^h_a$ denote the quantity of security $a$ purchased or sold by household $h$, and let $Q_a$ be the “ex-dividend” price at time zero (i.e. under the convention that $Z_{a,s_0} = 0$).

In state $s$, the household’s income used for consumption (i.e. consumption expenditure) is

$$
I^h_s = \begin{cases} 
\sum_{j \in J_s} P^h_{js} Y^h_{js} + \sum_{a \in A} D^h_a Z_{a,s}(\{P_{js} : j \in J_s\}) & \text{if } s \neq s_0, \\
T^h + \sum_{j \in J_s} P^h_{js} Y^h_{js} - \sum_{a \in A} D^h_a Q_a & \text{if } s = s_0.
\end{cases}
$$

That is, for all states except the initial state, consumption expenditure is equal to income, and is the value of the household endowment plus the payoffs of the household’s asset holdings. In the initial state, income used for consumption is the value of the endowment plus any transfers, less the purchase price of the household’s asset holdings. In all states, there is a budget constraint for consumption in the state,

\(^{36}\)Separating contingent commodities into states and goods available in each state will give meaning to the financial structure described below.
\[ \sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} X_{j,s}^h \leq I_s^h. \]

Household asset allocations are constrained by limited participation constraints or other kinds of limits. The constraints on households’ asset positions are summarized by

\[ \Phi^h(\{D_a^h\}_{a \in A}) \leq \bar{0}, \quad (17) \]

where \( \Phi^h \) is a vector-valued function, convex in \( D^h \). Limited participation is the key form of constraint I am attempting to capture with these \( \Phi \) functions, but it is not the only kind of constraint that fits into this framework.

Having defined expenditure and prices, I define the standard indirect utility function in each state,

\[ V^h(I_s^h, \{P_{j,s}\}_{j \in J_s}; s) = \max_{\{X_{j,s}^h \in \mathbb{R}^+\}_{j \in J_s}} U^h(\{X_{j,s}^h\}_{j \in J_s}; s) \]

subject to

\[ \sum_{j \in J_s} P_{j,s} X_{j,s}^h \leq I_s^h. \]

Using these indirect utility functions, we can write the portfolio choice problem as

\[ \max_{\{D_a^h \in \mathbb{R}\}_{a \in A, s \in S}} \sum_{s \in S} V^h(I_s^h, \{P_{j,s}\}_{j \in J_s}; s) \]

subject to the budget constraints that define income (equation (16)) and the constraints on asset allocation (equation (17)). Note that I fold the household’s discounting and subjective probability assessments into the state-dependent direct and indirect utility functions. In a competitive equilibrium (that is, taking asset prices \( Q \) and goods prices \( P \) as given, defined below), this is the problem households solve when choosing their asset allocation.

I will call the other type of agents in the economy intermediaries, and use \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) to denote a particular intermediary. Intermediaries are like households (in the sense that all of the notation above applies, with some \( i \in I \) in the place of an \( h \in \mathcal{H} \), except that they face different constraints on their portfolio choices. In particular, households are constrained to trade only with intermediaries, but intermediaries can trade with both households and other intermediaries.

The constraint that households can trade only with intermediaries, but not each other, can be implemented using this notation in the following way. The set of assets, \( A \), is a
superset of the union of disjoint sets \( \{A^h\}_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \), denoting trades with household \( h \). For a given household \( h \), the function \( \Phi^h \) implements the requirement that, for all \( a \in A \setminus A^h \), \( D^h_a = 0 \). To be precise, if \( a \in A \setminus A^h \) and \( D^h_a \neq 0 \), then there exists an element of \( \Phi^h(D^h) \) strictly greater than zero. The set of assets also includes assets that cannot be traded by any household. Define \( A^l = A \setminus (\cup_{h \in H} A^h) \) as the set of securities tradable only by intermediaries.

For arbitrage between the asset market \( A^l \) and the asset market \( A^h \) to exist, intermediaries must face financial constraints. The approach of this paper, in contrast to the much of the existing literature on arbitrages, is to assume that the constraints faced by intermediaries are induced by government policy. That is, I will assume that some of the \( \Phi^i \) functions are the government’s policy instrument; in contrast, the \( \Phi^h \) functions are assumed to be exogenous. The assumption that the \( \Phi^h \) cannot be augmented by regulation does not constrain the social planner. Because all trades are intermediated, and the government can constrain intermediaries, the government can effectively control all of the trades in the economy, and therefore implement any allocation that could be implemented with agent-specific taxes (see proposition 2 in the main text).

The notion of equilibrium is standard:

**Definition 2.** An equilibrium is a collection of consumptions \( X^h_{j,s} \) and \( X^i_{j,s} \), goods prices \( P_{j,s} \), asset positions \( D^h_a \) and \( D^i_a \), transfers \( T^h \) and \( T^i \), and asset prices \( Q_a \) such that:

1. Households and intermediaries maximize their utility over consumption and asset positions, given goods prices and asset prices, respecting the constraints that consumption be weakly positive and the constraints on their asset positions,

2. Goods markets clear: for all \( s \in S \) and \( j \in J_s \),

\[
\sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} (X^h_{j,s} - Y^h_{j,s}) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} (X^i_{j,s} - Y^i_{j,s}),
\]

3. Asset markets clear: for all \( a \in A \),

\[
\sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} D^h_a + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} D^i_a = 0, \quad (18)
\]

4. The government’s budget constraint balances,

\[
\sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} T^h + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} T^i = 0. \quad (19)
\]
The definition of equilibrium presumes price-taking by households and intermediaries. Absent government constraints, each household $h$ can trade with every intermediary, and the price of asset $a \in A^h$ will be pinned down by competition between intermediaries. The equilibrium definition supposes that this will continue to be the case, even if the government places asymmetric constraints on intermediaries— for example, by granting a single intermediary a monopoly over trades with a particular household. In this case, it is as if the household had all of the bargaining power. Such a policy is unlikely to optimal, and will never be the unique optimum.

I next describe a planner’s problem for this economy. I assume that the planner is unable to redistribute resources ex-post (doing so would allow the planner to circumvent limited participation). Instead, in the spirit of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), I will allow the planner to trade in asset markets on behalf of agents, trading for each agent only in markets the agent can participate in, to maximize a weighted sum of the household’s indirect utility functions, subject to an ex-ante participation constraint for intermediaries.

**Definition 3.** The constrained planner’s problem is

$$\max \left\{ D^h_a \in \mathbb{R} \right\}_{a \in A, h \in \mathcal{H}}, \left\{ D^i_a \in \mathbb{R} \right\}_{a \in A, i \in \mathcal{I}}, \left\{ P^i_a, s \in \mathbb{R}^+ \right\}_{a \in A, i \in \mathcal{I}, s \in S}, \left\{ T^h_i \in \mathbb{R} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{I}}, \left\{ T^h_h \in \mathbb{R} \right\}_{h \in \mathcal{H}}$$

subject to the intermediaries’ ex-ante participation constraint,

$$\sum_{s \in S} V^i(I^i_s, \{P^i_a, s \in J^i_s, s\}) \geq \bar{V}^i, \forall i \in \mathcal{I};$$

household’s limited participation constraints,

$$\Phi^h(D^h_a) \leq \bar{0}, \forall h \in \mathcal{H},$$

intermediaries exogenous portfolios constraints,

$$\Phi^{i, exog}(D^i_a) \leq \bar{0}, \forall i \in \mathcal{I},$$

the definition of incomes $I^h_s$ and $I^i_s$ (16), market clearing in assets (18), the government’s
budget constraint (19), and goods market clearing for each state \( s \in S \) and good \( j \in J_s \),

\[
\sum_{h \in H} (X_{j,s}^h (I_{s}^h, \{ P_{j',s}^j \}_{j' \in J_s}) - Y_{j,s}^h) = \sum_{i \in I} (X_{j,s}^i (I_{s}^i, \{ P_{j',s}^j \}_{j' \in J_s}) - Y_{j,s}^i).
\]

Here, \( X_{j,s}^h (I_{s}^h, \{ P_{j',s}^j \}_{j' \in J_s}) \) denotes the demand function for good \( j \) by agent \( h \) in state \( s \). Note that the definition of the social planner’s problem includes only exogenous constraints on intermediaries’ trades (\( \Phi^{i,\text{exog}} \)). Note also that I have chosen to write the planner’s problem as maximizing household utility subject to an ex-ante participation constraint for intermediaries, because this fits best into the example from the text; nothing would change if instead the planner maximized a weighted combination of all agents’ utilities. Next, I define constrained (in)efficiency:

**Definition 4.** A competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient if there exists Pareto weights \( \lambda^h \) and outside options \( \bar{V}^i \) such that the allocation of assets and goods in the competitive equilibrium coincides with the solution to the planner’s problem. Otherwise, the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient.

Lastly, I will define macro-prudential regulation. Regulation, in this framework, are additional convex functions \( \Phi^{i,\text{reg}}(\{D_a^i\}_{a \in A}) \) such that the intermediaries face the constraint \( \Phi^i(\cdot) = [\Phi^{i,\text{reg}} \Phi^{i,\text{exog}}] \). As discussed in the text, for notational simplicity I assume that these functions depend only on asset quantities and not on asset prices. Because the equilibrium gradient on these constraints is the only quantity that matters for equilibrium, this assumption is without loss of generality.

**D Alternative Definition of the Externality-Mimicking Portfolio**

In this section, I provide a definition of the externality-mimicking portfolio as a portfolio of arbitrage-able assets (as opposed to a portfolio of replicating portfolios). Defining

\[
\tilde{\theta}^{A^*,x} = \tilde{\theta}(\theta^{A^*,x}),
\]

where \( \theta^{A^*,x} \) is the externality-mimicking portfolio of definition 1, and

\[
\tilde{\chi}_a = -Q_a + \sum_{a' \in A} w_a'(a) Q_{a'},
\]

\[
\tilde{\chi}_a = \frac{-Q_a + \sum_{a' \in A} w_a'(a) Q_{a'}}{Q_a},
\]

63
we can see that the following defines a portfolio of arbitrage-able assets with payoffs identical to those of $\theta^{A^*, r}$.

**Definition 5.** The alternative externality-mimicking portfolio is a portfolio arbitrage-able assets in $A^*$, with weights on the risky assets equal to

$$\tilde{\theta}^{A^*, r} = (\Sigma^{A^*, r})^{-1}(\tilde{\chi}^{A^*} - \tilde{\chi}_f \frac{\mu^{A^*, r}}{R_f}),$$

(20)

and a weight on the risk-free asset equal to

$$\tilde{\theta}_f^{A^*, r} = -\frac{(\tilde{\theta}^{A^*, r})^T \mu^{A^*, r}}{R_f} + \frac{1}{(R_f)^2} \tilde{\chi}_f.$$

(21)

This definition is identical to definition 1, except that the arbitrage is now normalized by the asset price (as opposed to the replicating portfolio price) and the expected returns, variance-covariance matrix, and risk-free rates are for the arbitrage-able assets as opposed to the replicating portfolios.

**E  Proofs**

**E.1 Proof of Proposition 1**

For a formal definition of the planner’s problem discussed in this proof, see appendix section C.

Consider a perturbation to the solution of the planner’s problem in which the planner re-allocates an asset $a \in A$ from agent $i$ to agent $h$. If such a perturbation is feasible, we must have (by differentiability)

$$-\lambda_0^{h_0} V_{I, s_0}^{h_0} \sum_{s \in S} \sum_{j \in J_s} \mu_{j,s} [X^h_{I, j,s} - X^i_{I, j,s}] Z_{a,s}([P^*_j]_{j \in I_s}) = \sum_{s \in S} (\lambda^i V^i_{I, s} - \lambda^h V^h_{I, s}) Z_{a,s}([P^*_j]_{j \in I_s}),$$

where $\lambda^i$ is the multiplier on intermediary $i$’s participation constraint and $\mu_{j,s} \lambda_0^{h_0} V_{I, s_0}^{h_0}$ is the multiplier on the goods-market clearing constraint. Note that the derivatives $X^h_{I, j,s} = \frac{\partial}{\partial I} X^h_{j,s}(I, \{P^*_j\}_{j \in I_s})|_{I = P^*_s}$ and $V^h_{I, s} = \frac{\partial}{\partial I} V^h_{I, s}(I, \{P^*_j\}_{j \in I_s})|_{I = P^*_s}$ are evaluated at the solution to the planner’s problem. Note also that I have normalized the multiplier to units of dollars, rather than social utility, using the marginal utility of an arbitrary agent $h_0$. 

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By the definition of the wedges, this is

\[
\lambda^{h_0}V_{I,s_0}^h \sum_{s \in S_j \in J_s} \left( \pi_s^r \tau_{j,s} - \frac{1}{|J_s|} \sum_{j' \in J_s} \frac{\mu_{j',s}^{r,s}}{P_{j',s}} \right) P_{j,s}^* \left[ X_{I,j,s}^h - X_{I,j,s}^i \right] Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}) = \\
\sum_{s \in S} \left( \lambda^h V_{I,s}^h - \lambda^h V_{I,s}^i \right) Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}).
\]

By non-satiation, the identity \( \sum_{j \in J_s} X_{I,j,s}^h P_{j,s}^* = 1 \) holds, and this simplifies using the definition of the externalities to

\[
\lambda^{h_0}V_{I,s_0}^h \sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r \Delta_{s}^{h,i,r} Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}) = \sum_{s \in S} (\lambda^h V_{I,s}^i - \lambda^h V_{I,s}^h) Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}).
\]

By the first-order condition for the transfer between \( h_0 \) and \( h \),

\[
\lambda^{h_0}V_{I,s_0}^h = \lambda^h V_{I,s_0}^h
\]

and likewise \( \lambda^{h_0}V_{I,s_0}^h = \lambda^i V_{I,s_0}^i \), and therefore

\[
\sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r \Delta_{s}^{h,i,r} Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}) = \sum_{s \in S} \left( \frac{V_{I,s}^i}{V_{I,s_0}^i} - \frac{V_{I,s}^h}{V_{I,s_0}^h} \right) Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s})
\]

\[
= \sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r (M_{s}^{i,r} - M_{s}^{h,r}) Z_{a,s}(\{ P_{j,s}^* \}_{j \in J_s}),
\]

where

\[
M_{s}^{h,r} = \frac{V_{I,s}^h}{\bar{\pi}_s V_{I,s_0}^h}.
\]

### E.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Observe first that, via quantity constraints on portfolio choices, the planner can dictate the asset allocations of all agents. So any allocation (including any optimal allocations) can be implemented via portfolio constraints.

Moreover, for each asset, the planner can implement the allocation without regulating one agent’s trade in that asset. If the planner regulates the quantities for all other agents who can trade that asset, market clearing will ensure the unregulated agent holds the desired asset allocation. In this case, the asset price will be determined by the valuation of the
unregulated agent.

Applying this logic to all assets \( a \in A^h \) for some \( h \in H \), the planner can implement any desired allocation without regulating the household \( h \). All other households cannot trade that asset, and hence do not need to be regulated either. Generically, the planner will need to regulate the trades of all intermediaries in that asset.

Applying the same logic to the assets in \( A^I \), which no household can trade, it is without loss of generality to designate one intermediary, \( i^r \), as unregulated for all the assets in \( A^I \).

In such an implementation, equations (2) and (3) hold. The result immediately follows by proposition 1 and those equations.

### E.3 Proof of Proposition 3

The first two of these claims are simply the definition of the least-squares projection. That is

\[
\left( \sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r R_s^l (R_s^l)^T \right)^{-1} \left( \sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r R_s^l \Delta_s^{h,i,r} \right) = \left[ \sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r R_s^l (R_s^l)^T \right]^{-1} \left[ \begin{array}{c} \chi_a \\ \chi_f \end{array} \right] - \left[ \begin{array}{c} \chi_a \\ \chi_f \end{array} \right] = \left[ \begin{array}{c} \theta_a^{A^*,r} \\ \theta_f^{A^*,r} \end{array} \right].
\]

where \( R_s^l \) is the vector form of \( \{ R_{a,s}^l \}_{a \in A^*} \). The mean externalities, by construction, are

\[
\sum_{s \in S} \pi_s^r \Delta_s^{h,i,r} = \frac{\chi_f}{R_f},
\]

and the claim about the variance follows.

I prove the third claim below. Define the Lagrangian, using \( R_{a,s}(1 - \chi_a) = R_{a,s}^l \), as
The FOC for \( m \) is
\[
\pi^r_s(m_s - m^I_r) + \pi^r_s \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a R_{a,s} = 0.
\]
Plugging this back into the problem,
\[
\max_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^{|A^*|}} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^r_s \left( \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a R_{a,s} \right)^2 - \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a \left[ (1 - \chi_a) - \pi^r_s m_s \right] R_{a,s} = 0
\]
which simplifies, using the assumption that \( m^I_r \) prices the replicating portfolios (\( \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^r_s m^I_s R_{a,s} = 1 \)), to
\[
\max_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^{|A^*|}} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^r_s \left( \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a R_{a,s} \right)^2 - \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a \left[ \sum_{s \in S_1} \pi^r_s (1 - \chi_a) - m^I_r R_{a,s} + R_{a,s} \sum_{a' \in A^*} \theta_{a'} R_{a',s} \right] = 0.
\]
It follows immediately that \( \theta^* \), the solution to this problem, is the projection of \( \chi_a \) onto the space of returns, and hence is the externality-mimicking portfolio. Observe, by construction, that the mean return of the externality-mimicking portfolio is \( \frac{1}{R^f} = \left( \frac{1}{R^f} - \frac{1}{R^f} \right) \).
Therefore,
\[
m^r_s = m^I_r - \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_{A^*} R_{a,s}
\]
is the household SDF that minimizes the variance of the difference between SDFs subject to the constraint that the SDFs are consistent with the observed arbitrages.

Lastly, consider the fourth claim: the externality-mimicking portfolio maximizes the Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage.
\[
\hat{S}^{A^*,I,r}(\theta) = S^{A^*,I,r}(\hat{\theta}(\theta)) - S^{A^*,I,r}(\theta)
\]
\[
= \frac{\hat{\theta}(\theta)^T \mu^{A^*,I,r}}{R_f} - \sum_{a \in A^*} \hat{\theta}_a(\theta) - \frac{\theta^T \mu^{A^*,I,r}}{R_f} - \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a
\]
\[
= \frac{\sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a (\chi_a - \chi_f \mu^{A^*,I,r}_R)}{(\theta^T \Sigma^{A^*,I,r} \theta)^{\frac{1}{2}}}
\]

Suppose not; let \(\hat{\theta}\) be some portfolio with a higher ratio. Note that the Sharpe ratio due to arbitrage is homogenous of degree zero. Moreover, mixing in some amount of the risk-free rate does not change this ratio,

\[
\sum_{a \in A^*} \hat{\theta}_a (\chi_a - \chi_f \mu^{A^*,I,r}_R) = \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a (\chi_a - \chi_f \mu^{A^*,I,r}_R)
\]

It is therefore without loss of generality to suppose that

\[
\sum_{a \in A^*} \hat{\theta}_a \mu^{A^*,I,r} = \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a \mu^{A^*,I,r}
\]

and

\[
\sum_{a \in A^*} \hat{\theta}_a \chi_a = \sum_{a \in A^*} \theta_a \chi_a.
\]

But in this case, \(\hat{\theta}\) must achieve a higher payoff than the externality-mimicking portfolio in (22), a contradiction.

**Internet Appendix References**


